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The Rights and Obligations of States in Disputed Maritime Areas: What Lessons can be 
Learned from the Maritime Boundary Dispute between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire? 
Youri van Logchem 
 
Abstract  
Unilateral acts undertaken in disputed maritime areas, particularly in relation to mineral 
resources, frequently lead to conflict between States. Appraisals of the scope that remains for 
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas under international law exist in both case law and 
literature, but the precise scope remains shrouded in doubt. The ruling of the Tribunal in 
Guyana v. Suriname – building its argumentation extensively on that of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures) – is 
significant in this regard, clarifying, at least to a certain extent, the scope for unilateral 
conduct. Recently, in September 2017, in the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and 
Cȏte d’Ivoire a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) addressed the lawfulness of unilateral conduct by Ghana in a disputed maritime 
area. The Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire judgment throws a completely different light on the matter, 
compared to this earlier case law, making revisiting the topic of what the rights and 
obligations of States are in disputed maritime areas highly necessary and topical.  
                                                        
  Lecturer at, and Member of, the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea University 
(United Kingdom); PhD Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht University (the 
Netherlands). The author would like to thank Professor Alex Oude Elferink, Jessica Schechinger and Sir 
Michael Wood, for their invaluable comments. Any faults or omission are, of course, the sole responsibility 
of the author. 
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1. Introduction 
Frequently, acts are undertaken unilaterally in disputed maritime areas in relation to mineral 
resources. This might involve a broad spectrum of categories of acts that are different in 
nature and aim: i.e., acts paving the way for activities related to mineral resources to proceed 
through concessioning; activating these concessions; conducting seismic work to map out the 
mineral resource potential in a disputed maritime area; undertaking exploratory drilling to 
assess whether earlier located deposits are commercially viable; and appropriating mineral 
resources through exploitation.1 Along this range of conduct, different measures of damage 
will be caused to the marine environment.2 These unilateral acts when undertaken unilaterally 
regularly engender conflict between claimant States; however, the exact measure thereof 
varies with the specific situation and the type of conduct concerned.3 It is not easy to answer 
the question what unilateral acts can be lawfully undertaken in disputed maritime areas in 
relation to mineral resources from the perspective of international law; perhaps inherently so 
due to that the circumstances surrounding a particular disputed maritime area are entwined 
with determining this scope.4 Scholars also continue to puzzle over this issue.5 
The most recent addition to the case law relevant to the issue of unilateralism in disputed 
maritime areas is the judgment on the merits in the dispute between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire 
(Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire) that was handed down by a Special Chamber of ITLOS (Special 
Chamber or Chamber) on 23 September 2017.6 Also relevant in this regard is the interim 
measures order that was delivered by ITLOS previous thereto, on 25 April 2015.7 
More specifically, this article will seek to analyze to what extent Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire has 
                                                        
1 Youri van Logchem, The Status of a Rule of Capture under International Law of the Sea with Regard to 
Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related Activities, 26 Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 196-246 (2018). 
2 Corazon Morales Siddayao, Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf: Potentials and Constraints in the Asia-
Pacific Region, 9 Ocean Management 74 (1984). 
3 See, e.g., Jared Bissinger, The Maritime Boundary Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar: Motivations, 
Potential Solutions, and Implications, 10 Asia Policy 109 (2010); Youri van Logchem, The Scope for 
Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 175 (Clive H. 
Schofield, Seokwoo Lee & Moon-Sang Kwon eds., 2014). 
4 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 196-197. 
5 See e.g., Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of 
Undelimited Maritime Areas (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2016), available at 
www.biicl.org/documents/1192_report_on_the_obligations_of_states_under_articles_743_and_833_of_unclos_i
n_respect_of_undelimited_maritime_areas.pdf?showdocument=1, at 18. 
6 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment, 23 Sept., 
2017, Case no. 23, p. 2 (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment)). 
7 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cȏte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean (Ghana/Cȏte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Provisional Measures, Order, April 25 2015 (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire 
(Provisional Measures)). 
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made a positive contribution on two issues: first, the interpretation of paragraph 3 of Article 
83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC, or Convention) as such, 
predominantly the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize continental shelf delimitation, given 
that it figured quite heavily in this case; and, second – which is, to a certain extent, 
intermingled with the first issue – the issue of what the rights and obligations of States are in 
relation to mineral resources within disputed maritime areas on the basis of Ghana/Cȏte 
d’Ivoire.  
In addition, an alternative line of inquiry will be considered, i.e., the question whether, in 
relation to the remaining scope for unilateralism in disputed maritime areas, there has been a 
blurring of the distinction between lawful and unlawful unilateral acts because of how the 
Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire framed its reasoning and the conclusions it reached in 
relation thereto. There is a general caveat in relation to the scope remaining for unilateralism 
in disputed waters concerning mineral resources under international law: it has never fully 
crystallized.8 After analyzing the case law rendered before Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire it could be 
stated with greater certainty that, unilateral conduct causing irreparable prejudice to rights 
would be prohibited in a disputed maritime area.9 However, the judgment of the Special 
Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire (see section 5.2) raises some fundamental questions 
regarding the state of international law in relation to unilateral conduct in disputed maritime 
areas. 
In terms of organization, this article is divided into two parts. The first part will offer a more 
general introduction to the topic at hand, unilateralism in disputed maritime areas (see section 
2). Attention will be first directed towards disputed territorial sea, exclusive economic zone 
(EEZs) and continental shelf areas as a general phenomenon. This is necessary because the 
Special Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire was called upon to effect a delimitation of these 
maritime zones conjointly. After shortly describing the reasons how disputed maritime areas 
came into being and can be dealt with, the international legal framework applicable to these 
areas in the period prior to delimitation will be laid out. Relevant in this regard are Articles 
                                                        
8 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 195-197; David H. Anderson & Youri van Logchem, Rights and Obligations in 
Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND LAW OF THE SEA 
206 (S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh & Robert Beckman eds., 2014). 
9 See e.g., Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 366 
(1984). 
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15, 74 and 83 LOSC.10 Special emphasis will be placed on paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC, 
dealing with disputed continental shelf areas, fulfilling a central role in the argumentation of 
Cȏte d’Ivoire (see in particular sections 4.1 and 5.1); the modalities of this paragraph will be 
laid out in sections 3.2-3.5. 
Two cases, respectively dealt with by the ICJ and an Arbitral Tribunal and delivering their 
decisions some three decades apart, respectively in 1976 in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
(interim measures) and in 2007 in Guyana v. Suriname (see section 3.5),11 have contributed 
to a more advanced understanding of how to interpret the rules and obligations of 
international law that are relevant in pinpointing the existing scope for unilateralism in 
disputed EEZ and continental shelf areas. Both cases involved disputed maritime areas, in 
which acts in relation to mineral resources were undertaken unilaterally, and against which 
one of the parties to the dispute protested. Guyana v. Suriname will be looked at as to how 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC has been understood in this case. Also, the ICJ’s decision in 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures) will be analyzed. The Tribunal in its award 
Guyana v. Suriname attributed a central role to what the ICJ held in the aforementioned 
interim measures procedure, in interpreting paragraph 3. Guyana v. Suriname has been 
argued, wrongly in the view of this author, to have resolved the conundrum of what scope is 
reserved for unilateralism in relation to mineral resources within disputed EEZ/continental 
shelf areas.12 Although the decision in Guyana v. Suriname, heavily building on the ICJ’s 
ruling in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures), can be applauded for clarifying, 
to a certain extent, the scope for unilateral acts relating to mineral resources, the award and 
the reasoning of the Tribunal, has tended to provoke questions of its own. One of these 
questions is the extent to which it is appropriate to apply, by analogy, the findings of this 
Tribunal to disputed maritime areas in a general sense; and thus considering it to be the final 
word on what scope remains for unilateralism in disputed maritime areas.13 
Distinguishing Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire from the previously mentioned case law, was the extent 
                                                        
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3. 
11 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey), Provisional Measures, Order, 1976 I.C.J. 3 
(September 11); Guyana/Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal 17 Sept., 2007, ¶ 467, available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902. 
12 See Stephen Fietta, Guyana/Suriname, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 120 (2008); Shigeki Sakamoto, Japan-China 
Dispute Over Maritime Boundary Delimitation – From a Japanese Perspective, 51 Japanese Y.B of Int’l L 101 
(2008). 
13 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 183-192. 
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of unilateral acts undertaken by a party to a maritime boundary dispute, i.e., Ghana, in 
relation to mineral resources in a disputed maritime area. An important aspect to this dispute 
is that Ghana was on the verge of starting to produce oil from previously drilled wells. 
Questions about the lawfulness of the unilateral acts by Ghana already rose to the fore in the 
interim measures phase, in which Cȏte d’Ivoire contested their lawfulness. The primary 
measure of interim protection sought from the Special Chamber was that, Ghana would be 
ordered to put all mineral resource activity related within the disputed area on hold prior to 
delimitation.14 An important motivation for Cȏte d’Ivoire to take this position was as follows: 
through the unilateral acts of Ghana, the exclusivity of its sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf was infringed upon to an extent that the resulting damage was irreparable 
(see section 5.1).15 In formulating this argument, Cȏte d’Ivoire relied heavily on the 
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize the final delimitation of a disputed continental shelf 
area, which is contained in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC.16 During the merits phase, this 
line of argument was repeated by Cȏte d’Ivoire. As a result, the Chamber was called upon to 
interpret the wide and diversified range of unilateral conduct by Ghana in relation to the 
disputed continental shelf area, inter alia, through the lens of paragraph 3. New light is shone 
by the final judgment of the Special Chamber on the content of the obligation to not hamper 
or jeopardize. Standing in the way of a more elaborate analysis of this paragraph however, 
was the way in which Cȏte d’Ivoire committed its submissions on this point to paper (see 
section 5.3).  
The second part of the article will closely analyze the specifics of the dispute between Ghana 
and Cȏte d’Ivoire. It will look at the following aspects: the arguments presented by the parties 
to the dispute, both in the phase of the interim measures (sections 4.1-4.2) and on the merits 
(section 5). In both phases, arguments were presented by both sides to the dispute about the 
(un)lawfulness of the unilateral conduct in the disputed maritime area. Yet, an important 
difference was that the States concerned approached this issue from very different angles. 
The conclusions arrived at by the Special Chamber in these respective stages in relation to the 
                                                        
14 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Provisional Measures), supra note 11, Request for the prescription of provisional 
measures submitted by the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire under Article 190, paragraph 1, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 27 February 2015 (Request for provisional measures submitted by Côte 
d'Ivoire), at 2. 
15 See e.g., Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Provisional Measures), supra note 11, Request for the prescription of 
provisional measures submitted by the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, at 10-11. 
16 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Provisional Measures), supra note 11, Request for the prescription of provisional 
measures submitted by the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, at 8. 
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(un)lawfulness of this unilateral conduct will also be discussed (see sections 4.3 and 5.3). 
Before delving into this issue, the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and Cȏte 
d’Ivoire before the Special Chamber will be closely analyzed by first discussing the interim 
measures phase, to then move to the dispute on the merits. Following this, the aspect of how 
the Special Chamber has ruled on the arguments presented by the parties in these two phases 
will be at the center of analysis (see section 5.3).  
After discussing the intricacies of this dispute, the findings of the Special Chamber will be 
placed in a broader context, by applying them to the questions that lie at the core of this 
contribution: that is, was a better understanding offered of the meaning of paragraph 3 of 
Article 83 LOSC, or more broadly, in relation to the issue of what the rights and obligations 
of States are concerning disputed maritime areas, specifically in relation to mineral 
resources? 
2. Disputed maritime areas and unilateralism 
Due to the proximity of certain coasts of States, combined with the expansion of entitlements 
to maritime zones up to at least 200 nautical miles (nm) in the form of the EEZ and 
continental shelf, and the extension of the breath of the territorial sea to 12 nm, disputed 
maritime areas were inevitably created.17 Disputed maritime areas are those areas where 
neighboring States have advanced overlapping claims to maritime zones, be it e.g., the 
territorial sea, EEZ or (extended) continental shelf, or a combination thereof. Areas of this 
type are voluminous in the international landscape.18 For instance, African States have 
completed a little over half of the amount of delimitation exercises they can go through in 
total; however, some of these concern boundaries that have been partially delimited, but leave 
the remainder undefined.19  
Disputed maritime areas can create different levels of conflicts between coastal States having 
overlapping claims, ranging from no problems arising between them to that, disputes are 
frequent. Undertaking unilateral acts in connection with mineral resources in disputed 
maritime area is particularly prone to prompt a response from the other claimant State. Two 
                                                        
17 ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 147-148 (3rd ed., 1999); 
Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 192-195. 
18 H.M. Al Baharna, Legal Implications of Maritime Boundary Disputes (With Special Reference to the Gulf), 
68 Y.B. of Islamic & Middle Eastern L. 70 (1994); Clive H. Schofield, Even More Lines in the Sea, in OCEAN 
LAW AND POLICY: TWENTY YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE UNCLOS REGIME 399 
(Carlos Espósito et al. eds., 2016). 
19 Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3), supra note 5, at 85. 
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ways can be identified as to how claimant States can respond to unilateral conduct:20 
protesting and taking physical action. Yet, there are fundamental differences between these 
types of responses: protesting is a lower intensity response than formulating a physical 
reaction, e.g., through sending navy vessels to the area concerned in an attempt to put a halt 
to unilateral conduct.21 Giving a reaction to a unilateral act may be called for in certain 
circumstances, and might prevent a State from being confronted with the argument that by 
staying silent it has acquiesced in the lawfulness of that conduct; or, alternatively, in the 
claim of the other State over the area.22 An example illustrating the importance of giving 
some response, is the dispute currently under consideration, with Ghana contending that 
through Cȏte d’Ivoire’s silence in connection with the disputed area, and the related conduct 
set in motion therein, it had acquiesced in a equidistance boundary line (see e.g., section 
5.2).23 
Article 15 LOSC is the relevant provision in case overlapping territorial sea claims arise. It 
contains the following delimitation rule: the territorial sea boundary is the equidistance line, 
unless another line is justified by a special circumstance or historic title. This same solution 
applies in the shape of an interim rule to the period preceding delimitation of the disputed 
territorial sea area, with the same caveat: no historic title or special circumstance can be in 
play.24 In their absence, the equidistance line would signify the outer point up to which a 
claimant can exercise sovereignty prior to delimitation.  
Beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf will enter into 
the picture. Disputed EEZ and continental shelf areas arise regularly in the international 
landscape: in fact, the majority of disputed areas remaining outstanding today involve one or 
a combination of these two maritime zones.25 States can delimit their disputed EEZ or 
                                                        
20 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 175. 
21 For example, after Guyana allowed an oil rig to be placed within a disputed maritime area, to commence with 
exploratory drilling, Suriname put a halt to this conduct by sending its naval vessels. The Tribunal 
concluded that Suriname breached Article 2(4) United Nations Charter and general international law. It was 
particularly held against Suriname, that it issued an ultimatum: the rig would need to ‘leave the area at 
once, or the consequences will be yours’. See, Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 445, 476. 
22 M. Shah Alam & A. Al Faruque, The Problem of Delimitation of Bangladesh’s Maritime Boundaries with 
India and Myanmar: Prospects for a Solution, 25 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 408-409 (2010). 
23 Another example is that silence on the part of Turkey was construed by Greece in Aegean Continental Shelf 
(interim measures) as coming to the former’s detriment, in that it acquiesced in Greece’s continental shelf claim. 
See e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, Dissenting opinion of Judge Stassinopoulos, at 36-37. 
24 SATYA N. NANDAN AND SHABTAI ROSENNE (EDS.), UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II 135 (1993).  
25 Tim Martin, Energy and International Boundaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY LAW 181 (Kim Talus ed., 2014); Anderson and Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 192, 198. 
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continental shelf area by way of a negotiated boundary agreement between the coastal States, 
or through a delimitation effected by an international court or tribunal. Paragraph 1 of 
Articles 74 and 83 LOSC contains the basic rules governing the delimitation of overlapping 
EEZ or continental shelf claims: the ultimate boundary has to be equitable.26 These identical 
provisions have been regularly criticized for providing limited guidance to States having 
overlapping claims.27 However, this has not prevented States from reaching delimitation 
agreements successfully; moreover, practice in this regard continues to expand.28 Bringing a 
disputed EEZ or continental shelf area under the reach of a cooperative arrangement is 
another option for the States concerned, most of which can be considered provisional 
arrangements in the sense of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 LOSC.29  
There are concurrent claims of coastal States to sovereignty (concerning the territorial sea), or 
sovereign rights (pertaining to the EEZ or continental shelf), with regard to the same 
maritime area prior to its delimitation.30 The entitlements to maritime zones and related 
sovereignty, sovereign or jurisdictional rights of coastal States over a disputed maritime area 
already exist prior to delimitation, however.31 In a way, the area of overlapping claims 
appertains to all of the claimants involved prior to delimitation. Or so it has been argued.32 
However that may be, there may be uncertainty over the extent to which States can exercise 
their rights in relation to disputed maritime areas.33 But, there is an important difference 
between the EEZ and continental shelf.34 The sovereign rights coastal States have over the 
continental shelf are inherent and exist ab initio and de jure.35 This is not the case concerning 
                                                        
26 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982, I.C.J. 18, 59 (February 24). 
27 See e.g., Malcom D. Evans, Maritime Delimitation after Denmark v. Norway: Back to the Future?, in THE 
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 156 (Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999); VICTOR PRESCOTT AND CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE 
MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 246 (2005). 
28 Alex G. Oude Elferink, International Law and Negotiated and Adjudicated Maritime Boundaries: a Complex 
Relationship, 48 German Y.B. Int’l L. 231, 235-236 (2015). 
29 E.g., the preamble to a provisional arrangement concluded between Algeria and Tunisia, establishing a 
provisional maritime boundary between the coasts of the two States, explicitly refers to paragraph 3 of Arts. 74 
and 83 LOSC. See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries 
between the Republic of Tunisia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 2002, 2238 UNTS 197. 
30 Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 198. 
31 Y.M. Yusuf, The Role of the 1982 UNCLOS in the Resolution of Maritime Boundary Disputes, 7 Int’l 
Energy L. Rev. 288-289 (2011). 
32 See e.g., Enrico Milano & Irini Papanicolopulu, State Responsibility in Disputed Areas on Land and at Sea, 
71 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 590 (2011). 
33 VICTOR PRESCOTT, THE GULF OF THAILAND: MARITIME LIMITS TO CONFLICT AND 
COOPERATION 17 (1998). 
34 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 24-25 (June 3). 
35 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) 
and (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark)), Merits, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3-
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the EEZ: one will need to be established by making an explicit claim.36 Usually, the aspect of 
inherency of State’s rights over the continental shelf has been argued to imply the following: 
sovereign rights automatically cover the mineral resources embedded therein.37 Interestingly, 
the Special Chamber’s reasoning in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire (judgment) seems to be at odds 
herewith, raising the suggestion that delimitation is constitutive of rights (see section 6). 
 
3. Disputed maritime areas: the international legal framework  
The waters located off the adjacent coasts of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have been known, for 
some time, to contain significant deposits of mineral resources.38 Tullow Oil, having its 
primary seat in London, was the petroleum company primarily concessioned by Ghana to 
conduct a variety of exploratory and exploitation work related to mineral resources in the 
disputed maritime area. Significant amounts of deposits were struck in several locations of 
the disputed area: fields showing particular promise were Jubilee field and Tweneboa, 
Enyenra and Ntomme (these are colloquially known as ‘TEN’).  
It is difficult to pinpoint with precision when the dispute over the maritime boundary 
materialized between the two States; complicating this is Cȏte d’Ivoire being inactive in 
relation to the area concerned, at least, for some period of time.39 Its silence spanned several 
decades according to Ghana,40 which fed the latter’s belief that Cȏte d’Ivoire had agreed that 
those parts located on Ghana’s side of an equidistance boundary, including those rich in 
mineral resources, belonged to Ghana. At some point in time, according to Ghana in 2011,41 
Cȏte d’Ivoire actively started to claim areas beyond the equidistance boundary line in relation 
to which Ghana had begun extensive mineral resource activity.42 These activities required 
making significant previous investments; e.g., in connection with enabling installations to 
move into position, and their operation coming at great cost. This made clear that the oil 
                                                                                                                                                                            
56, ¶ 19 & 39; MALCOM D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION 
55 (1989). 
36 Art. 57 LOSC. 
37 See e.g., Masahiro Miyoshi, The Basic Concept of Joint Development of Hydrocarbons on the Continental 
Shelf, 3 Int’l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 7 (1988). 
38 Ghana Told to Stop New Drilling in Disputed Waters, BBC, 26 April 2015. 
39 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 130. 
40 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 102. 
41 Oil: Nation Eager to Remain Master of its Own Destiny, Financial Times, 14 December 2011: ‘Officials say 
they first got wind of this when the Ivorian government wrote to oil companies requesting that they cease 
activities in waters long considered to be on Ghana’s side.’ 
42 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 130, 189. 
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companies were heavily invested in the area. So that the Chamber would determine that the 
areas concerned would be on Ghana’s side of the boundary after delimitation, was seriously 
important for the latter.  
According to Ghana, the observed silence by Cȏte d’Ivoire had by then come to amount to its 
acquiescence. This was due to Cȏte d’Ivoire’s non-reaction in relation to Ghana’s activities, 
which had been on-going for a significant period, providing Cȏte d’Ivoire with many 
opportunities to protest. The silence or inaction of a State in a situation where the converse, 
i.e., taking some action, was called upon, may amount to acquiescence, in that rights are 
established under international law coming to the detriment of the silent State.43 By this same 
token, and in defining what was at the heart of the dispute, Ghana made it clear that it was not 
involved in a dispute about delimitation;44 rather, the issue was the confirmation of a pre-
existing boundary that was developed through acquiescence. 
After learning Ghana had engaged in a wide range of unilateral activity in the disputed area, 
Cȏte d’Ivoire approached petroleum companies that had received concessions for nine blocks 
from Ghana. Cȏte d’Ivoire, in a letter,45 ordered these companies to abandon operations and 
refrain from acting on further commitments there as well.46 Discoveries of large quantities of 
mineral resources was argued by Ghana to have created this newfound interest on the part of 
Cȏte d’Ivoire in the area concerned.47 Cȏte d’Ivoire denied this to be its motivation, 
producing a different version of events: Ghana knew, of the area having become a subject of 
dispute between them, certainly as early as 1992. Although fully aware of the area concerned 
not exclusively and uncontestably belonging to Ghana,48 it did not alter its behavior 
accordingly by adopting restraint in relation to the disputed area, which would have been the 
appropriate response from the view of international law according to Cȏte d’Ivoire.  
3.1 Establishing a single maritime boundary 
In the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire, the Special Chamber 
was requested to establish a single maritime boundary for the seabed and superjacent waters, 
                                                        
43 Nuno Marques Antunes, ‘Acquiescence’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), 3, online edition, www.mpepil.com. 
44 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 69. 
45 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 134. 
46 Oil: Nation Eager to Remain Master of its Own Destiny, Financial Times, 14 December 2011. 
47 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 110-111, 131. 
48 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 585. 
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covering conjointly the territorial sea, EEZ and (extended) continental shelf.49 Because the 
coasts of Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire are placed adjacent to each other,50 their entitlements to all 
maritime zones, which are measured from the designated baselines, overlap where the land 
boundary terminates. The LOSC is silent on what the applicable legal rules are concerning a 
single maritime boundary – for instance, whether Articles 74 and 83 LOSC have any 
application in its determination, has not been explicated in the international case law. 
International courts and tribunals have simply assumed that these Articles are applicable 
whenever they were called upon to determine a single maritime boundary.51 The Special 
Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire considered that the maritime boundary for the territorial 
sea, EEZ, and the (extended) continental shelf could be delimited by using the same 
methodology.52 
3.2 Paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC 
Delimitation of the maritime boundary between the coasts of Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire was 
one aspect of their dispute on which the Special Chamber was asked to rule. In addition, the 
Chamber was faced with an ancillary issue: were the unilateral activities undertaken 
concerning mineral resources in the disputed maritime area lawful from the view of 
international law?53  
Cȏte d’Ivoire took the following position, inspired in part by the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize contained in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC: pending continental shelf 
delimitation, a moratorium was imposed on unilateral acts concerning mineral resources. 
Upon learning of the objections of Cȏte d’Ivoire, rather than that Ghana abandoned its 
unilateral conduct, it intensified its level of activity in the disputed area; this was construed 
by Cȏte d’Ivoire as posing a breach of paragraph 3 as well.54  
Paragraph 3 will usually become relevant if States whose coasts lie opposite or adjacent to 
                                                        
49 See e.g., Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 87. 
50 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 64. 
51 See e.g., Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2014, ¶ 179; Barbados v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 11 April 2006, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 234-235; Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No. 
16, Judgment of 14 March 2012, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/published/C16-J-14_mar_12.pdf; Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, ¶ 285-286 (Cameroon v. Nigeria). 
52 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 261-263, 409. 
53 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 542. 
54 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, supra note 6, Counter-memorial of Cȏte d’Ivoire, Volume I (4 April 2016), at 120. 
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each other, have been unsuccessful in delimiting their overlapping claims over the same 
continental shelf area.55 The latter paragraph reads, in full, as follows: 
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation. 
Paragraph 3 imposes two obligations tailored toward different aims on claimant States 
pending delimitation: seeking cooperative arrangements, in the form of the obligation to 
“make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature“; and 
observing restraint, so as “not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement”.56 
Hence, in terms of overall aim, paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC seeks to steer between 
cooperation and abstention.57  
At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Third Conference), positions 
on the design of paragraph 3 fell effectively along two lines.58 One group of States argued for 
using a unilateral equidistance boundary line as an interim rule. This boundary line would 
come to divide a disputed continental shelf area, and formed the outer point up to which a 
claimant could exercise jurisdiction pending delimitation.59 Heavily opposed to this approach 
was another group of States, which encouraged the conclusion of provisional arrangements 
between claimants as an applicable interim rule.60 The gist of their proposals was that, a 
failure to come to cooperative arrangements would activate the interim solution of a 
                                                        
55 By combining this with that the LOSC operates on the assumption of there being no underpinning sovereignty 
disputes, meaning that clarity exists in the geographical extent of the coastal State’s rights, it may be that 
disputed maritime areas where interweaving sovereign issues exist are beyond the reach of paragraph 3 of 
Article 83 LOSC. See, Youri van Logchem, Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and Gas Resources in Maritime 
Areas of Overlap: the Falklands (Malvinas), 28 Hague Y.B. Int’l L. 42 (2017).  
56 See e.g., R. Beckman, Legal Framework for Joint Development in the South China Sea, in UN 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 254 (S. Wu, M. Valencia et al. 
eds., 2014). 
57 Kamal Hossain, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Provisional Arrangements Relating to 
Activities in Disputed Maritime Areas, in LAW OF THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE HUGO CAMINOS 678 (Lilian del 
Castillo ed., 2015). 
58 STEPHEN FIETTA AND ROBIN CLEVERLY, A PRACTIONER’S GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY 
DELIMITATION 84-85 (2016); Lagoni, supra note 9, at 349. 
59 See e.g., A/CONF.62/C.2/L.14 (1974), Third Conference Official Records, Vol. III 190-191 (The 
Netherlands). 
60 See e.g., A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 (1974) Third Conference Official Records, Vol. III 221 (Ireland). 
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moratorium on economic conduct in a disputed area.61  
After agreement was reached on a text that was agreeable for the two doctrinally split 
groups,62 and after paragraph 3 of Article 83 was included in the Convention, critical voices 
soon started to emerge, questioning the merits of this provision.63 Opinions as to the 
usefulness of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC can be seen to have undergone some change 
from the moment of its introduction into its framework. Primarily, the ruling in Guyana v. 
Suriname has brought about a change in thinking as to the importance of paragraph 3; 
although it has not been immune from criticism either. Since then, opinion can be seen to 
have shifted largely towards the paragraph not being empty, but, to the contrary, carrying 
actual weight.64  
Despite this trend, the exact significance of this obligation remains subject of debate, varying 
from being of more minor importance to fulfilling a significant role in limiting acts of 
unilateralism.65 The decision of the Special Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire gives cause for 
revisiting this statement as to the usefulness of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC, swinging the 
pendulum in favor of the view that paragraph 3 is mere rhetoric. By throwing a completely 
different light on the importance of paragraph 3, the Chamber, arguably, interpreted the 
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize in a way to render it almost meaningless. 
3.3 Interpreting the obligation to seek provisional arrangements 
 
In the case between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire, the latter did not allege in its formal 
submissions that Ghana had committed a breach of the obligation to seek provisional 
arrangements.66 As a result, the obligation to seek provisional arrangements played a more 
marginal role in this case, with the Special Chamber laying out in more broad strokes what 
this obligation requires of the States concerned.67 However, in its pleadings, Cȏte d’Ivoire did 
                                                        
61 See e.g., NG7/15 (1978, mimeo), Article 83, para. 3 (Papua New Guinea). Reproduced in: RENATE 
PLATZODER, THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA DOCUMENTS 
VOLUME IX 406 (1986). 
62 Fietta & Cleverly, supra note 58, at 25. 
63 Lucius Caflisch, The Delimitation of Marine Spaces between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts, in A 
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA, VOLUME 1 495 (Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes 
eds., 1991). 
64 See e.g., Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 191-192. 
65 See e.g., Hossain, supra note 57, at 674-676. 
66 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 628. 
67 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 626-627. 
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suggest that breaches of the obligation to seek provisional arrangements had occurred. This 
seems to be the reason that the Tribunal addressed the meaning of this obligation; albeit to a 
more minimal extent, as compared with the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.68 
 
In general terms, under the first obligation encountered in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC, 
claimant States are required, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, to make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. An implication of this is 
that, when negotiations on provisional arrangements have begun, the States concerned must 
approach these with a spirit of understanding and cooperation. This implies that States have 
to be considerate of each other’s rights and positions in relation to a disputed maritime area, 
combined with showing a cooperative attitude.69 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal 
emphasized the importance of developing a disputed maritime area pursuant to agreed 
provisional arrangements.70 This is a continuation of a line of argument, which international 
courts and tribunals have been advocating for a while now: the favored response to deal with 
difficulties that can emerge from having overlapping claims is seeking and agreeing on 
cooperative arrangements by the States involved.71 The thrust of this approach is as follows: 
whenever it is feasible, provisional arrangements covering the disputed maritime area in the 
period that precedes delimitation should be created. This would enable the States concerned 
to mutually pluck fruits from developing a disputed area economically; otherwise, such 
development probably has to be deferred to until after delimitation.  
Despite the measure of importance ascribed to cooperative arrangements, there is a caveat 
however. The Tribunal in its award in Guyana v. Suriname framed the extent of the positive 
obligation under paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC in the following way: States are 
under a duty to make good faith attempts to come to a provisional arrangement, constituting 
an obligation of conduct. A breach of this obligation would be avoided when earnest effort 
have been made by the States concerned at arriving at this result.  
3.4 Interpreting the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize 
In contrast, playing a prominent part in this case was the negative obligation in paragraph 3 
                                                        
68 See e.g., Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 607. 
69 See e.g., See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 205-206. 
70 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 460. 
71 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 191-192. 
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of Article 83 LOSC: the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize reaching a delimitation 
agreement. Côte d’Ivoire relied heavily on this obligation, and alleged that Ghana committed 
several breaches thereof (see section 5.1). Clearly, the idea of abstention or restraint 
underpins the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation.72 More specifically, it 
embodies the general thought of discouraging certain unilateral acts from being undertaken in 
relation to a disputed continental shelf area.73  
There are two sides to the obligation not to hamper or jeopardize, in that it relates to both 
actions and reactions of claimant States undertaken concerning a disputed continental shelf 
area.74 The following rationale underlies this obligation: were claimant States to continue to 
act unilaterally in relation to their disputed continental shelf area, or if they were to react in a 
particular way to unilateral conduct, the difficulties in reaching the final delimitation would 
be enhanced as a result (be it through their own efforts in the shape of a delimitation 
agreement or submit the maritime boundary dispute to an international court or tribunal).75 
The converse side to the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, in that a reaction to a 
unilateral act can have a detrimental effect on the chances of reaching the final delimitation, 
is illustrated in the reaction of Suriname to Guyana allowing an oil rig to move into a 
disputed maritime area, in order to initiate exploratory drilling.76  
Although there is clarity in terms of spirit (i.e., to exercise restraint), the precise sphere of 
operation of the obligation is far less straightforwardly established, with the paragraph itself 
failing to single out specific acts surpassing the threshold of non-hampering or jeopardizing; 
therewith, leaving the material reach of this obligation unspecified. The two words “hamper” 
and “jeopardize” are central to developing an understanding of the meaning of this obligation 
and assist in ascertaining the types of unilateral conduct that are captured under its reach. 
These terms cannot be treated as synonyms however. The insertion of these two terms injects 
a distinction into paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC: acts having an effect of either hampering 
or jeopardizing must be abjured prior to delimitation of the disputed continental shelf area. 
Particularly illustrating that the words convey different meanings is the use of the disjunctive, 
                                                        
72 Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3), note 5, at 23-24; Xinjun Zhang, Why the 
2008 Sino-Japanese Consensus on the East China Sea Has Stalled: Good Faith and Reciprocity Considerations 
in Interim Measures Pending a Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 42 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 57-58 (2011),  
73 See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 207; Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 179. 
74 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 192, 195. 
75 Caflisch, supra note 63, at p. 495; Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 48-49. 
76 Guyana/Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 445, 476. 
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“or”, separating the two words of ‘hampering’ and ‘jeopardizing.’77  
Because of the inclusion of the words ‘every effort’ in the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize contained in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC,78 the obligation is transformed into 
an obligation of conduct.79 The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘every effort’ would suggest 
this indeed being the case. The effect this good faith component has on the content of the 
negative obligation in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC is that, what is resultantly required is 
that genuine efforts must have been made by the States concerned to avoid engaging in acts 
having a subsequent effect of hampering or jeopardizing the final delimitation. An alternative 
reading of the language of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC is that the requirement of every 
effort, solely operates in connection with the obligation to seek provisional arrangements; this 
would arguably better comport with the meaning of not hampering or jeopardizing 
delimitation, which is akin to a prohibition.80 However, this interpretation is problematic: if 
the words “shall make every effort” are not linked to the second limb of the sentence 
contained in paragraph 3, it would be incomplete and grammatically incorrect. However, the 
addition of the words “shall make every effort” implies that the obligation could be violated 
if the result expected by one States (i.e., reaching delimitation) has not been achieved, or is 
regarded to have been complicated by one State, due to acts of unilateralism having been 
undertaken by another claimant. 
 
The extent of the limitation imposed by the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is 
dependent on an act having a hampering or jeopardizing effect on the successful completion 
of the final delimitation. However, whether a unilateral act hampers or jeopardizes varies 
with the specific circumstances of the case.81 So, there is a variable in play: a unilateral act 
may have an effect of hampering or jeopardizing reaching a delimitation agreement between 
certain States, but may not have a similar effect between other States. Hence, categorizing 
acts caught under the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize cannot be defined in abstracto: 
the specifics of the disputed maritime area will be critical in this regard. This view is 
                                                        
77 Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3), supra note 5, at 24. 
78 Catherine Redgwell, International Regulation of Energy Activities, in ENERGY LAW IN EUROPE: 
NATIONAL, EU AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 61 (Martha Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell et 
al., eds., 2016). 
 
80 See e.g., SUN-PYO KIM, MARITIME DELIMITAION AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTH 
EAST ASIA 76 (2004); Zhang, supra note 72, at 57-58. 
81 Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 206; Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 185-186. 
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supported by Judge Paik’s separate opinion in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire,82 also arguing against 
designing closed categories of ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ activities in disputed continental shelf 
areas (see section 5.2.6). 
3.5 Paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC: what can be learned from the case law rendered prior 
to Ghana/ Cȏte d’Ivoire? 
There are two previous rulings (i.e., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures) and 
Guyana v. Suriname) that have contributed to better understanding of the content of 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC; the latter in a direct manner and the former indirectly. 
Although the decision of the ICJ in Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures) was 
rendered before the entry into force of the LOSC, and despite being an interim measures 
procedure, its decision remains important in interpreting paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. 
The continued relevance of Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures) is due to the fact 
that the final ruling the Tribunal delivered in Guyana v. Suriname, replicates largely, 
although with some minor variations, the reasoning of the ICJ from this earlier decision. In 
Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures), the ICJ in its decision elevated the standard of 
unilateral acts having an effect of causing irreparability to a State’s rights as the relevant rule 
of thumb to distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of a disputed continental shelf 
area.83  
However, whatever their merits may be, there are various reasons for these two decisions not 
pinning down the scope for unilateralism in relation to mineral resources in a definitive way. 
Importantly, Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures) was an interim measures 
procedure that operates according to its own rules, limiting its usefulness in interpreting 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC.84 Because a lower threshold than irreparability is perceived 
under hampering or jeopardizing, more acts than merely those surpassing the standard of 
irreparability would be captured thereunder however. But, more importantly, and this builds 
on the argument presented above, the aspect of that each disputed maritime areas has its own 
intricacies and surrounding dynamics renders speaking about what scope remains for 
                                                        
82 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik. 
83 The ICJ’s position seems to bear a close connection with the general rule of international law of causing no 
harm to rights of another State. See, Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3), supra 
note 5, at 20. 
84 Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 186-191. 
19 
 
unilateralism in such areas in conclusive terms inapposite.85  
3.5.1 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures)  
As regards those parts of the disputed continental shelf area of the Aegean Sea, where Turkey 
sought to map out the potential for mineral resources through seismic work and scientific 
research,86 Greece claimed to have exclusive entitlements, which encompassed a sole right to 
collect information about the composition of the seabed.87 Greece argued that through 
unilateral seismic work, its sovereign rights were breached and their exclusive character 
infringed upon. Such infringement was sufficient, according to Greece, for the ICJ to indicate 
measures of interim protection. However, beyond that the aspect of exclusivity was infringed 
upon, irreparability to Greece’s sovereign rights was also caused through seismic work.88 
In dealing with this argument, the ICJ acknowledged a risk of prejudice accompanying 
unilateral seismic work.89 However, it concluded in general sense that unilateral conduct of a 
mere transitional character, which encompassed seismic work, did not have a risk of 
prejudicing the rights of another claimant State irremediably. So, there seems to have been a 
lack of the required urgency, not enabling the Court to indicate measures of interim 
protection. Particularly important in this regard is that the resultant prejudice was found to be 
of a nature that could be repaired ex post facto; i.e., after the ICJ would have handed down its 
ruling on the merits as to where the continental shelf boundary lies. Hence, the 
materialization of the prejudice connected to unilateral seismic work was made dependent on 
that the area in question would ultimately be on Greece’s side of the established boundary.  
However, the ICJ did not generalize this position, in that every unilateral act carrying the risk 
of prejudice when undertaken in a disputed maritime area was acceptable. Central to this 
determination was the following question: can the harm caused through unilateral conduct be 
financially compensated after delimiting the continental shelf boundary? One type of act 
threatening the rights of another State with irreparability was placing an installation in 
contact with the disputed continental shelf area. Therefore, according to the ICJ in Aegean 
Continental Shelf (interim measures) it could not commence pendente litis.90 Furthermore, 
                                                        
85 Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 206; Van Logchem, supra note 3, at 186. 
86 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, Oral Pleadings 1976, at 141. 
87 Y. ACER, THE AEGEAN MARITIME DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONIAL LAW 37 (2003). 
88 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, ¶ 30. 
89 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, ¶ 31. 
90 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, ¶ 30. 
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exploratory drilling and the actual appropriation of mineral resources, or making attempts 
thereto, would likewise lead to irreparability. These acts thus fell in the category of unilateral 
acts concerning a disputed continental shelf area that would have merited the indication of 
interim measures of protection.91 In the overall analysis of the ICJ, there being a physical 
component attached to a unilateral act was critical, in that the continental shelf would have 
been somehow modified.92 A similar emphasis can be seen in the dispute between Guyana 
and Suriname;93 on which more in the next section. 
3.5.2 Guyana v. Suriname 
Now, to turn to the maritime boundary dispute between Guyana and Suriname. The main 
emphasis in this section will be on retracing the steps of the Tribunal, which led it to 
ultimately attributing a central role to the ICJ’s decision in Aegean Continental Shelf (interim 
measures) in its own interpretation of the content of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. Both 
parties to the dispute relied on paragraph 3 claiming that it had been breached by the other 
State. The primary event instigating the formulation of arguments on either side of the parties 
to this dispute based on paragraph 3 was a petroleum company, licensed only by Guyana, 
moving a drilling rig into a disputed area to begin exploratory drilling. Guyana argued that 
the positioned oil rig was allowed to unilaterally drill in the disputed area: no discernible 
differences exist between drilling and seismic work, both being lawful exploratory 
activities.94 Suriname based itself on the opposite view, at the core of which was the 
dissimilar nature of the two acts. An appraisal of the lawfulness of drilling and seismic work 
had to be informed by different considerations, in the view of Suriname. Guyana having 
authorized exploratory drilling was construed by Suriname as to have altered status quo: that 
is, to a degree that the chances of effecting a delimitation were impeded upon.95  
The Tribunal interpreted the two obligations included in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC,96 in 
a way that the imposition of a moratorium on economic activities pending delimitation needs 
to be avoided.97 In distinguishing between permissible and impermissible unilateral conduct 
concerning disputed continental shelf areas, the Tribunal assessed whether “the risk of 
                                                        
91 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, ¶ 30. 
92 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 11, ¶ 32. 
93 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 468-469. 
94 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, Reply of the Republic of Guyana, Volume 1 (1 April 2006), at 141-143. 
95 See e.g., Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, Rejoinder of the Republic of Suriname, Volume 1 (1 September 
2006), at 130. 
96 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 465. 
97 Guyana v. Suriname, supra note 11, ¶ 463. 
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physical damage to the seabed or subsoil” accompanies a unilateral act. Based on this 
criterion, unilateral exploratory drilling and the actual taking or the making attempts to take 
such resources were considered unlawful. To the contrary, however, activities of an 
exploratory nature, encompassing both prospecting and licensing for mineral resources, could 
generally be undertaken in relation to disputed continental shelf areas. An important 
component informing the analysis of the Tribunal on this point was that seismic work was 
designated to be of a transitory character by the ICJ in Aegean Continental Shelf (interim 
measures).98 However, exploratory drilling and exploitation needed to be treated legally 
different from unilateral seismic testing according to the Tribunal,99 with the former two acts 
resulting in a ‘perceived change to the status quo’.100 
Despite being the most elaborate pronunciation on the meaning of paragraph 3 of Article 83 
LOSC, considerations produced in Guyana v. Suriname, notwithstanding some assumptions 
to the contrary,101 have proven not to be the definitive word on the matter of what scope is 
reserved for unilateralism in relation to mineral resources within disputed areas. The 
relevance of the specific circumstances surrounding a disputed maritime area in setting the 
scope for unilateralism is confirmed by the judgment of the Special Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte 
d’Ivoire, coming to very different conclusions compared to the Tribunal in its award in 
Guyana v. Suriname (see e.g., section 5.2). 
4. The first part of the proceedings between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire: interim 
measures stage  
Earlier in this article, the positions of Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire, and the handling of the 
arguments by the Special Chamber in the phases on the merits and interim protection, have 
been laid out in broad strokes. In turn, both these phases will be analyzed with a special 
emphasis on those aspects bearing on the issue of acts of unilateralism undertaken in disputed 
maritime areas concerning mineral resources. Section 4 will start with looking at the phase of 
the interim measures, which was initiated by Cȏte d’Ivoire in February 2015 with its request 
for interim protection, to then direct attention in section 5 to the dispute on the merits, on 
which the Special Chamber delivered its final judgment in September 2017. 
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Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, 26 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 374, 398 (2008); Sakamoto, supra note 12, at 
101. 
22 
 
4.1 Cȏte d’Ivoire’s position on interim measures 
Cȏte d’Ivoire’s stated reason for the request for interim protection was that the exclusivity 
existing for the coastal State to act concerning the continental shelf was infringed upon, 
predominantly basing its position on Articles 2(2), 56(1) and 77(1) LOSC. The exclusivity 
enjoyed by Cȏte d’Ivoire enabled it to engage in acts related to mineral resources that may be 
found in the continental shelf, to the exclusion of all other States. Under this logic, unilateral 
acts having an economic character had to be fully abjured prior a final delimitation. As a 
corollary thereto, Cȏte d’Ivoire’s request was tailored to putting a halt to activities already set 
in motion in the disputed area. In addition, it sought measures of interim protection to the 
effect of future conduct not being allowed to be undertaken – e.g., that no new permits were 
awarded or activated by Ghana in relation to the disputed maritime area for the duration of 
the Chamber not having handed down its ruling on the merits.102 If Ghana would be allowed 
to continue with unilateral conduct related to mineral resources, this would result in Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights becoming threatened with irreparability. Moreover, and this is 
aligned to the previous consideration, significant and irreparable harm to the marine 
environment was inevitable to ensue.103 Effects of this magnitude were argued to occur from 
the following range of unilateral activities: conducting (marine scientific) research; the 
concluding of contracts with the petroleum industry; the approval of seismic work; starting 
(exploratory or exploitation) drilling operations; and bringing installations into position of.104 
Along these lines, Cȏte d’Ivoire, in its oral pleadings, sought to demonstrate that the effects 
done by drilling into the seabed for mineral resources are such that, the seabed can, by 
definition, not be returned to its original state;105 rather, effects caused to the marine 
environment will be permanent. International law recognizes according to Cȏte d’Ivoire that 
the following elements are encompassed by a coastal State’s sovereign rights: having 
information in relation to mineral resources in terms of their amount, place where they are 
located, and whether the in situ available quantities would be suitable for commercial 
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exploitation.106 If, in the final ruling the area in question would be established to be on Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s side of the boundary, the possession of this information by Ghana would cause 
irreparable prejudice to its rights. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC was invoked by Côte d’Ivoire to further reinforce its 
position that its exclusiveness of rights over the continental shelf needs to be preserved prior 
to delimitation. Côte d’Ivoire took the position that the implication of paragraph 3 is that a 
moratorium on economic conduct was automatically introduced. Lifting this moratorium was 
tied to States having reached cooperative arrangements or a delimitation. Support for this 
position was provided, according to Côte d’Ivoire, by the debates at the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference. Here during negotiations, a number of States actively promoted the moratorium 
solution as the applicable rule prior to delimitation, and in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary between the States concerned. This interpretation is problematic, however: an 
interim rule based on a moratorium was a minority opinion at the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference, being held only by a smaller group of States (e.g., Ireland and Papua New 
Guinea).107 The gist of these proposals was virtually identical to the argument of Côte 
d’Ivoire: if claimant States were unsuccessful in setting up cooperative arrangements, a 
moratorium on economic conduct would be introduced. Aside from being limited in number, 
proposals advocating a ban on all economic activities met with a great measure of skepticism 
from other States, because of their economic consequences.108  
It is of note that Cȏte d’Ivoire’s reasoning on the point of a moratorium being introduced as 
an interim rule, seems to have not been entirely consistent. In its oral pleadings, Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’ argued that paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC does not imply that no room exists for 
economic conduct within a disputed maritime area; however, this position was turned on its 
head in the merits phase.109 Overall, the de facto effect of the position of Cȏte d’Ivoire was 
seeking to return the disputed maritime area to a state where Ghana had not acted unilaterally 
and unlawfully in relation to mineral resources, which it deemed to be the relevant status 
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quo.110 
4.2 Ghana’s position on interim measures 
Much of Ghana’s argumentation, designed around justifying it moving to the phase of 
exploitation, was tied to Cȏte d’Ivoire having acquiesced in the conduct of Ghana, by never 
having protested. In its pleadings, Ghana invoked a range of examples in support of its 
contention of acquiescence: e.g., the alignment of concessions given by the two States 
concerned, and that drilling and seismic operations had only commenced on their respective 
sides of the equidistance boundary line. The evidence invoked by Ghana to strengthen its 
argument consisted inter alia of it allowing the petroleum industry to proceed with work, by 
using the equidistance boundary line as the appropriate rule of thumb for acceding or denying 
requests from the industry.111 Further, and this functioned as the linchpin of Ghana’s 
argument, all this happened without the protest of Cȏte d’Ivoire. Ghana continued by trying 
to demonstrate, by going into significant detail, that its own practice of respecting the 
equidistance boundary was mirrored by the licensing practice of Cȏte d’Ivoire: the latter was 
restrained similarly in that the reach of its concluded contracts with the petroleum industry 
never crossed this equidistance line.112  
A second strand of argument presented by Ghana was that the request for the indication of 
measures of interim protection could not succeed, because Cȏte d’Ivoire did not intend to 
keep their disputed maritime area in pristine condition.113 The discovery of oil and gas fields 
in ‘the territory of Cȏte d’Ivoire’ would result in the roles of the two States being reversed, in 
that Ghana would have found itself on the outside looking in:114 Cȏte d’Ivoire with a similar 
zest, would have undertaken acts in connection with the mineral resources in the disputed 
area. Drawing a parallel with previous case law (i.e., Guyana v. Suriname or Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf (interim measures)), in an attempt by Cȏte d’Ivoire to bolster its argument 
that Ghana’s unilateral acts were unlawful, was misplaced, according to Ghana. This was 
because the facts existing between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire stood in stark contrast to these 
two previously mentioned cases, where there had been no ‘exploration or development’ by 
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either State.115 A fundamental difference was that, Suriname contested the lawfulness of all 
exploratory drilling within the disputed area, and Greece argued that no seismic work could 
be undertaken in relation to the disputed continental shelf area.116 Rather, according to 
Ghana, what was at the core of its dispute with Cȏte d’Ivoire, and inspiring the tone of the 
latter’s argumentation, was Cȏte d’Ivoire feeling entitled to enjoy the economic benefits that 
can be reaped from developing the mineral resources located in the disputed continental shelf 
area.117 
Another ground invoked by Ghana against having to put all its exploration and exploitation 
efforts on hold for the duration of the dispute over the maritime boundary being settled, were 
the economic implications that would have followed therefrom. Ghana considered these 
implications to be close to catastrophic: investments that were made at the time already 
exceeded USD 3 billion.118 To order Ghana to put a stop to the work would lead to investors 
withdrawing from their earlier commitments, dealing “a crippling blow”119 to Ghana’s 
economy – in fact, it would regress to a low point it had not been at for several decades.120 
Investors withdrawing were not the only negative consequence that followed from putting a 
stop to Ghana’s activities: infrastructure already being moved into the disputed area, with the 
aim of starting with the production of mineral resources, would begin to deteriorate because 
of falling into disuse.121 Ghana, in tailoring its argument to whether the requirement of 
urgency was fulfilled, being one of the requirements needing to be present in order for an 
international court or tribunal to offer interim protection, argued that the fact that it was able 
to progress to the stage of exploitation exemplified the lack thereof.122 Besides a lack of 
urgency, the requirement of irreparability was neither met: damages claimed to be incurred 
by Cȏte d’Ivoire lacked the element of irreparability; being able to be remedied through 
awarding damages ex post facto.123 Under its argument, Ghana did not distinguish between 
the different types of acts it undertook concerning mineral resources in terms of their 
reparability. No matter whether these acts were exploration or exploitation related, all of 
them could be compensated after delimitation with seemingly equal ease. 
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4.3 The order of the Special Chamber of ITLOS 
On 25 April 2015, the Special Chamber delivered its ruling on the question of whether 
interim measures of protection could be indicated, per the request of Cȏte d’Ivoire.124 Despite 
Cȏte d’Ivoire’s reliance on paragraph 3 of Articles 83 LOSC in its request for interim 
protection, and in face of that Ghana paid some lip service to it, no mention of this provision 
can be found in the order of the Special Chamber.125  
Two elementary requirements needed to be present according to the Chamber in order for it 
to be able to accede to a request for interim protection: a recognized urgency, and a real and 
imminent threat of irreparable prejudice to rights.126 Here, the Chamber seems to have 
followed the line of argument that has been inter alia set out earlier by the ICJ in it is ruling 
the Pulp Mills case: indicating interim measures of protection is inexorably interwoven with 
the presence of an urgent necessity to prevent that irreparable prejudice is done to the rights 
in dispute, before the Court having been able to give its final ruling on the matter.127 On the 
question whether in the case at hand, the thresholds of irreparability and urgency were 
surpassed, the Special Chamber gave a mixed answer. Gathering information and undertaking 
unilateral exploration and exploitation activities in connection with the disputed area was 
recognized by the Chamber to pose a threat of irreparability:128 to paraphrase, this unilateral 
conduct caused a “risk of irreversible prejudice” to Cȏte d’Ivoire’s rights.129  
What is especially interesting about this part of the order is that, the Chamber established a 
relationship that was hitherto not explicitly recognized to exist in the international case law: 
gathering information on a disputed continental shelf area, and putting it to use – being an act 
that does not alter the geography of the continental shelf – may possibly lead to irreparability 
being caused to another State’s rights. Among the rights a coastal State has over the 
continental shelf, and which might be irreparability infringed upon, is plausibly to obtain 
information and putting it to use exclusively and in a way of their own design:130 i.e., a right 
to information was acknowledged to exist by the Chamber. 
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Notwithstanding the Special Chamber’s finding that a “risk” of irreparability was caused by 
the unilateral acts of Ghana, this did not automatically imply that the required urgency was 
present, constituting a second hurdle that must be overcome for an international court or 
tribunal to be able to indicate interim measures of protection. Subsequently, the Chamber 
addressed when this consideration would enter into play: manifestation of this risk was tied to 
that the area in which the unilateral seismic work took place was considered to be under the 
jurisdiction of Cȏte d’Ivoire. Hence, the Chamber identifies two respective stages, i.e., before 
and after delimitation, showing significant similarity with the way in which the ICJ construed 
its analysis in Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures). Exploration activities that were 
undertaken by Turkey in connection with a disputed continental shelf area, carried in the 
view of the ICJ the inherent possibility of causing prejudice.131 However, this risk coming to 
fruition was entwined with the consideration of the area ultimately being considered to be 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Greece after the delimitation was established by the ICJ. In 
terms of this risk arising, the Special Chamber in Ghana/ Cȏte d’Ivoire reached a rather 
similar conclusion. However, at variance with the ICJ in Aegean Continental Shelf (interim 
measures) – the Chamber stated that damages incurred from producing mineral resources 
could be compensated by financial means ex post facto. In this regard, the Chamber 
considered only the relative ease with which unilateral exploitation can be compensated, 
implying that in relation to exploration activities, e.g., exploratory drilling and seismic work, 
this exercise of calculating the extent of damages will be more complicated.132 It does at face 
value indeed seem more difficult to calculate the damage caused through unlawful drilling 
and seismic work: e.g., how is one to compensate for obtaining an advantage by one claimant 
over another in terms of the information it possess through conducting seismic work or 
exploratory drilling? The Special Chamber did not further elaborate on how these relevant 
differences in connection with certain types of unilateral mineral resource activity interacted 
with calculating the height of compensation.  
However, away from the question of compensation, the Chamber recognized there being 
another side to Ghana’s exploration and exploitation activities undertaken in the disputed 
area: that is, the continental shelf was invariably modified as a result. Some of these physical 
modifications to the continental shelf cannot be remedied through financial compensation ex 
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post facto according to the Special Chamber.133 What was clear, however, is that 
compensation does not enable restoring the physical characteristics of the continental shelf to 
its original form; i.e., to the state prior to the unilateral act being undertaken.134  
It was not decisive for the Chamber that a particular unilateral act carried the potential for 
causing damage of an irremediable nature, as indicated earlier. Rather, the unlawfulness of a 
unilateral act was tied to the areas concerned being considered to be under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Cȏte d’Ivoire after delimitation. After emphasizing that it can give individual 
measures of interim protection different, in whole or in part, from those requested by the 
parties to a dispute, the Chamber addressed the ramifications of if Ghana were ordered to put 
a halt to its previously initiated conduct in relation to mineral resources in the disputed 
area.135 According to the Chamber, ordering Ghana to abort work had two consequences that 
predominantly argued against this, one of which was underlain by perceived financial 
ramifications; and the other concerned the marine environment being detrimentally 
affected.136 More specifically, what formed a serious threat to the marine environment was 
putting the infrastructure out of commission, which would invariably set in motion the 
deterioration process.  
However, the Special Chamber did not elaborate on why in the balance of things this 
particular environmental concern trumps the other environmental impacts caused by Ghana’s 
exploration and exploitation activities in the disputed area. Furthermore, the financial losses 
suffered by Ghana, and those being concessioned by it, would impose an “undue burden” on 
them.137 In balancing the aforementioned two considerations with the aspect of preserving the 
rights claimed by Cȏte d’Ivoire, particularly their exclusive character, the Chamber drew the 
line at drilling new wells, allowing previous drilling operations to continue unaffected.138 
Ghana, in addition, had to make sure that information being previously gathered, or that 
would be collected on future occasions from drilling, would not be used in a way that could 
come “to the detriment of Cȏte d’Ivoire”, if the areas were conclusively considered to be 
under its jurisdiction after delimitation.139 
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5. The second part of the proceedings between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire: merits stage  
During the merits phase, Ghana repeated much of its earlier presented arguments focusing on 
the silence observed by Cȏte d’Ivoire for over four decades, resulting in acquiescence.140 
Cȏte d’Ivoire disputed that there was acquiescence on its part, as evinced by its various 
protests. Two main reasons were invoked by Cȏte d’Ivoire to argue that the unilateral acts of 
Ghana were unlawful: the exclusivity the sovereign rights Cȏte d’Ivoire claimed to have was 
infringed upon; and, Ghana’s unilateral conduct exerted a separate effect of hampering and 
jeopardizing delimitation. 
5.1 Cȏte d’Ivoire’s contentions 
According Cȏte d’Ivoire, it became clear in the 20th Century that there was a maritime 
boundary dispute between Ghana and itself. Particularly relevant in this regard were two 
events occurring in 1988 and 1992, during which Cȏte d’Ivoire sought that Ghana postponed 
its unilateral activities.141 This made it abundantly clear, according to Cȏte d’Ivoire, that it 
never recognized the outer point of earlier given concessions of Ghana (i.e. not crossing the 
equidistance line) as being the location where the maritime boundary lies.142  
After reviewing the relevant case law, Cȏte d’Ivoire concluded that the standard as to when 
tacit agreement can be assumed to exist to be set very high by international courts and 
tribunals, whenever they were faced with such claims. A mere alignment in the scope of 
awarded concessions, would be insufficient of meeting this threshold.143 Contrary to the 
picture sketched by Ghana, claiming that its activities had been continuously on-going over 
decades, reality according to Cȏte d’Ivoire was different. Two aspects illustrated this. First, 
the majority of Ghana’s drilling operations were concentrated in the period between 2009 and 
2014; and, second, Ghana speeding up its unilateral activities was tied to receiving promising 
results as to the commercial viability of certain oil and gas fields located in the disputed 
area.144 The protests made by Cȏte d’Ivoire did not deter Ghana from increasing its level of 
activity however. 
In support of its contention of Ghana having breached paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 
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LOSC, Cȏte d’Ivoire invoked three considerations. First, the unilateral acts undertaken by 
Ghana in the disputed area exerted an effect of hampering or jeopardizing; second, Ghana’s 
uncompromising stance in negotiations was contrary to both paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 
LOSC; and, third, that for some time Ghana was unwilling to have the matter adjudicated by 
an international court or tribunal, breached these two paragraphs.145  
In its counter-memorial, Cȏte d’Ivoire analyzed the meaning of Article 83 LOSC in a wider 
sense. It began by pointing out that Ghana’s unilateral conduct resulted in a breach of an 
obligation flowing from paragraph 1 of Article 83 LOSC: through undertaking acts 
unilaterally, Ghana had abandoned all willingness to negotiate in good faith on settling the 
maritime boundary dispute.146 In elaborating further on how paragraph 1 of Article 83 LOSC 
was breached, Cȏte d’Ivoire pointed to Ghana’s behavior being synonymous with the latter 
seeking to effect a maritime boundary through creating a “fait accompli”, rather than through 
agreement as paragraph 1 explicitly requires.147 The importance of the obligation to hold 
good faith negotiations was argued by Cȏte d’Ivoire to have been enhanced in light of that, 
the oil and gas field located in the disputed area could be considered a “shared deposit”.148 
Cȏte d’Ivoire built the majority of its argumentation on the point of the unlawfulness of the 
unilateral activities around paragraph 3, predominantly the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize delimitation of the continental shelf. The origins of the obligation to negotiate 
towards a provisional arrangement, and it becoming a constituent part of paragraph 3, was 
traced back to the division that pervaded during the Third Law of the Sea Conference over 
the extent to which limitations had to be imposed on the scope for unilateral economic 
conduct within a disputed area.149 Determining where the continental shelf boundary lies 
between the coasts of Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire, was according to the latter complicated by 
the unilateral mineral resource activity of Ghana.150 One of the aspects that enhanced the 
difficulties encountered in this regard was the scale on which Ghana undertook unilateral acts 
in relation to the disputed continental shelf area. The chosen strategy of Cȏte d’Ivoire 
revolved around an attempt to show that refraining from unilateral economic conduct in a 
disputed maritime area is mandated pursuant to international law – “les activités économiques 
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unilatérales sont prohibées dans une zone litigieuse”.151 Its argumentation on this point, 
falling effectively along two lines, will be explored in turn over the next two paragraphs. 
Combining the gist of paragraph 3 of Articles 83 LOSC, particularly its negotiating history, 
with the exclusivity of sovereign rights of the coastal States the following could be concluded 
according to Cȏte d’Ivoire: unilateral economic conduct had to be completely eschewed prior 
to continental shelf delimitation.152 In an attempt to reinforce its argument, Cȏte d’Ivoire 
relied heavily on one particular holding set out in Guyana v. Suriname, in which the Tribunal 
held that activities brought under the reach of a provisional arrangement could be undertaken 
pending delimitation.153 Isolated from its context, this holding can perhaps be interpreted as 
to mean that concluding a provisional arrangement precedes the possibility to undertake 
unilateral conduct within a disputed maritime area. However, when read in conjunction with 
other holdings of the Tribunal, the force of this presented argument ebbs away quickly. This 
is because in these other holdings, the Tribunal rather emphasized that some room must be 
reserved for unilateral conduct in connection with mineral resources.154 Furthermore, it went 
on to draw a divisional line between different categories of unilateral activity, placing some 
economic activities in the permissible category, whereas others in the impermissible one, 
undercutting Cȏte d’Ivoire’s reading of Guyana v. Suriname further. 
In addition, Cȏte d’Ivoire carefully detailed its argument that the principle of exclusivity 
would entail that no economic activities can commence prior to delimitation. Under 
international law, the coastal State (i.e., Cȏte d’Ivoire) enjoys exclusive use over the adjacent 
continental shelf because of it having sovereignty over territory, which encompasses the 
mineral resources in the continental shelf, as is reaffirmed in Articles 77 and 81 of the 
LOSC.155 Breaches were made on this exclusivity of the sovereign rights of Cȏte d’Ivoire, 
through the full range of unilateral activities concerning mineral resources undertaken by 
Ghana. Two detrimental effects are exerted by unilateral seismic work according to Cȏte 
d’Ivoire, making it unlawful: first, it is a “source of serious tension” between the States 
concerned; and, second, vital information on the resources of the seabed will be provided and 
be placed at the exclusive disposal of that State, offering it considerable advantages in e.g., 
negotiations with the petroleum industry, or in (delimitation) negotiations with the other 
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claimant State that has not acquired the same piece of information.156 The history of effected 
maritime boundary delimitations laid bare a recurrent pattern in the view of Cȏte d’Ivoire:157 
once “invasive activities” were undertaken unilaterally within the disputed maritime area and 
prompted a protest form the other claimant, subsequently, acts of this nature were eschewed 
pending delimitation.158 Despite Cȏte d’Ivoire’s protests, and it requesting Ghana to put all its 
unilateral conduct on hold on account of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC, Ghana acted at 
variance with this detected pattern. This is seen in that instead of abandoning its practice of 
acting unilaterally concerning the disputed maritime area, as would have been the required 
response from the view of international law, Ghana decided to amplify the intensity with 
which it started to act unilaterally. 
5.2 Ghana’s contentions 
One of the main contentions presented by Ghana was that there was silence on the part of 
Cȏte d’Ivoire, amounting to a de facto maritime boundary lying between their coasts. 
Evidence of this came particularly in the shape of its “oil practice”, the provenance of which 
goes back to 1956.159 The range of acts undertaken by Ghana in connection with the disputed 
area, and which consistently failed to produce any kind of response from Cȏte d’Ivoire 
consisted of the following: auctioning concessions, entertaining applications from the 
petroleum industry, giving concessions, seismic surveying160 and exploratory drilling.161  
According to Ghana, acceptance of the equidistance boundary line started in 1957, with Cȏte 
d’Ivoire awarding a concession by using this same line as the outer limit; had more extensive 
areas been covered within its reach, an overlap would have formed with a concession given a 
year earlier by Ghana.162 To avoid such an overlap was according to Ghana the driving force 
behind Cȏte d’Ivoire restricting the reach of its given concessions to the equidistance line. 
Since then and despite broader areas becoming covered under awarded concessions, albeit 
that their precise area of application underwent some changes, a consistent pattern was 
argued by Ghana to have emerged: both parties to the dispute observed the equidistance 
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boundary line in their licensing policies.163 Drilling by Cȏte d’Ivoire on its own side of the 
equidistance line had in fact been extensive, with no less than 212 wells being drilled; but 
these never extended west of the equidistance line, thus crossing into areas which Ghana 
regarded to be under its exclusive jurisdiction.164 The accusations being directed by Côte 
d’Ivoire at Ghana for encroaching on the dispute area, were underlain according to the latter 
by a fundamental misconception: Ghana had not undertaken unilateral acts in relation to 
mineral resources located in a ‘disputed area’. Because of Côte d’Ivoire’s acquiescence,165 
Ghana’s unilateral conduct on its own side of the equidistance boundary line constituted an 
area under its exclusive jurisdiction. This made Cȏte d’Ivoire’s portrayal of these activities as 
being “unilateral” in nature, and occurring in a disputed maritime area, a misnomer.166 
At the center of Ghana’s argumentation was that a de facto boundary had evolved, but despite 
this main emphasis, Ghana did put forward an alternative line of argument based on 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. The quite heavy reliance of Cȏte d’Ivoire on this paragraph 
made it seemingly necessary for Ghana to address the meaning of paragraph 3. Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s reading of paragraph 3, coming down to introducing a moratorium on economic 
conduct in a disputed area, had, in the view of Ghana, no basis in the case law, literature or 
negotiating history; in fact, these uniformly laid out a view opposite to the one sketched by 
Cȏte d’Ivoire.167 When paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC is analyzed in its entirety, this 
argument is reinforced further: not only is there an obligation mandating States to abstain 
from undertaking certain types of acts unilaterally, but in addition, there is an obligation 
imported on States to seek provisional arrangements; however, the latter does not imply an 
actual obligation to successfully set up cooperative arrangements.168 Another strong 
presumption against the solution of the moratorium can be derived from the dispute between 
Guyana and Suriname. In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal placed great emphasis on 
avoiding the introduction of a moratorium:169 the economic implications that follow from 
bringing a disputed maritime area under the reach of a moratorium argued against this. And, 
as was pointed out by Ghana, Cȏte d’Ivoire conveniently ignored that the Tribunal drew a 
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dividing line between permissible and impermissible unilateral economic uses of a disputed 
maritime area.170  
5.3 The Special Chamber’s pronouncement on the merits 
The primary contention of Ghana was that a de facto maritime boundary had developed 
through acquiescence.171 Whether this contention was supported by the Chamber, will be 
addressed in the next section. Besides delimitation, there were several other “subsidiary” 
aspects to the judgment of the Special Chamber that merit further consideration, Two of these 
aspects were: had, as Ghana argued, Cȏte d’Ivoire’s silence amounted to acquiescence; and, 
were paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 LOSC breached by Ghana through it undertaking a 
wide range of unilateral acts concerning mineral resources? Whether paragraph 3 of Article 
83 LOSC or Cȏte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights, were infringed upon through Ghana’s acts of 
unilateralism, and whether international responsibility could be incurred for this, were 
matters of a more subsidiary nature. This was illustrated by that the Special Chamber’s 
handling of these issues formed a more minor part of the judgment. 
5.3.1 Acquiescence in the maritime boundary? 
Starting its analysis on the point of whether there was acquiescence in the maritime 
boundary, as alleged by Ghana,172 the Special Chamber recognized that concessions awarded 
by the two States aligned. Connected to this, operations undertaken in connection with 
mineral resources, being seismic surveying and drilling, similarly did not cross this boundary. 
After acknowledging that there was no crossing by either party to the dispute into areas lying 
on the other side of the equidistance boundary, the Special Chamber however rejected the 
argument of Ghana centering on the existence of a de facto maritime boundary.173 The 
Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire, falling back on Nicaragua v. Honduras, in which the ICJ 
in its decision indicated that because of their gravity maritime boundaries cannot be easily 
assumed to exist through acquiescence, indicated that evidence thereof must be 
“compelling”.174  
Next, the Chamber addressed why the threshold of compelling evidence was not met by 
                                                        
170 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, supra note 140, Reply of Ghana, at 151. 
171 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶. 104-105, 113, 116, 124-129, 130-136. 
172 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 100, 102. 
173 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 228. 
174 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 199, 212. 
35 
 
Ghana. One problematic aspect with Ghana’s position was that most of the evidence centered 
on the existence of a consistent oil practice.175 In finding that the evidence presented by 
Ghana relating to this oil practice did not bear out the existence of a pre-existing boundary, 
failing short of being compelling, there were three aspects to the Special Chamber’s denial on 
this point. First, although the record was patchy, in that Cȏte d’Ivoire protested irregularly 
and with varying intensity, it did protest on more than one occasion against Ghana’s 
unilateral conduct concerning mineral resources, so much was clear.176 Second, the Special 
Chamber entertained significant doubts whether a de facto maritime boundary, which was 
argued to encompass more than the seabed alone, could be shown to exist by relying solely 
on evidence pertaining to activities conducted in connection with the latter.177 Third, and 
which is aligned to the previous consideration, in terms of geographical reach, the activities 
of Ghana were restricted to areas falling within the 200 nm limit, putting into question what 
evidential weight such acts carry in proving the de facto existence of a maritime boundary 
also extending beyond 200 nm.178  
5.3.2 The maritime boundary established by the Chamber 
As regards the primary issue in dispute, that of where the boundary lies between the two 
States, the Special Chamber plotted a maritime boundary for the territorial sea, EEZ and 
continental shelf, also beyond 200 nm, following largely a line that is equidistant from the 
adjacent coasts of the States concerned. The boundary, beginning at the point where the land 
boundary terminates, from that point onwards it is more or less a straight boundary line (i.e., 
an unaltered equidistance line) extending up to a point beyond the 200 nm limit.179  
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Those parts of the disputed area where Ghana had given concessions pursuant to which 
Tullow Oil was on the verge of exploitation were all considered to be under Ghana’s 
exclusive jurisdiction. After the final ruling was delivered, Tullow Oil, by publishing a 
statement on its website, applauded the result,180 indicating that work would be resumed 
shortly. A consequence of the judgment of the Special Chamber is that the reach of certain 
previously issued concessions by both parties to the dispute would have to be revisited, as 
some of the blocks issued by them straddle the newly established maritime boundary.181 But, 
importantly, this did not concern areas in relation to which Ghana had begun exploration and 
exploitation activities.  
 
5.3.3 A judgment on delimitation: constitutive or declarative of rights? 
 
It is of note that on the issue of “the meaning of a judgment on the delimitation of the 
continental shelf”,182 the Chamber took a position at variance with those of the States 
involved. Where the parties to the dispute agreed that delimitation is of a declarative nature, 
although their views differed in relation to the consequences that followed from delimitation 
being declarative, the Chamber defined the nature of delimitation as consisting of both 
declarative and constitutive elements. Not only was this at variance with the positions of the 
States concerned, this is also at odds with previously rendered international case law. 
Looking at e.g., the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that delimitation is of a 
declarative nature: the undelimited continental shelf already belongs to the coastal State; 
meaning delimitation is not concerned “with the determination de novo of such an area”.183 
Closely connected to this finding of the ICJ was the consideration that the sovereign rights 
the coastal State has over the continental shelf are inherent and flow automatically from the 
State having sovereignty over territory.184 Following on these lines set out by the ICJ, Cȏte 
d’Ivoire took the position that the aspect exclusivity of sovereign rights is not dependent on 
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when the maritime boundary is established.185  
Rights of the coastal State to the continental shelf, being inherent and ab initio, would 
inevitably require a judgement of the Chamber to be declarative of these rights, in the view of 
Cȏte d’Ivoire. Under this logic, the rights a coastal State has over the continental shelf 
already exist, and so does their exclusiveness, also in relation to the disputed parts of a 
continental shelf. Through delimitation the geographical extent of these rights is determined 
conclusively, subsequently opening up the possibility for States to act exclusively on these 
rights in relation to mineral resources in areas on its own side of the boundary. Inevitably, 
however, by allowing acts to proceed unilaterally in relation to the disputed continental shelf 
area, the aspect of exclusivity of a State’s rights would be breached (see previous section 
5.1). 
Against the backdrop of Cȏte d’Ivoire’s contention that there is a general requirement of not 
conducting unilateral activities in a disputed maritime area,186 because the sovereign rights it 
enjoyed were exclusive in nature, Ghana contested the understanding that a delimitation is 
declarative in the way suggested by Cȏte d’Ivoire.187 In general, Ghana agreed with that 
delimitation is necessarily declarative in nature; otherwise, the disputed area would be a 
“terra nullius”.188 Although the States concerned were in agreement on delimitation being 
declarative of rights, this did not imply that Cȏte d’Ivoire was correct in arguing that its 
sovereign rights had been violated: “Ghana’s operations over many decades in the now-
disputed area” could not be considered breaches of these rights, according to Ghana.189 
Neither did the consequence of the ab initio and ipso facto character of sovereign rights over 
a continental shelf change this: “belatedly declaring” having claimed rights over the disputed 
area did not have a consequential effect of that previous lawfully undertaken conduct would 
now breach the sovereign rights of Cȏte d’Ivoire, even after the latter altered the extent of its 
claim to maritime zones.190 So, Ghana placed great emphasis on that the acts it undertook 
related to an area that was not in dispute, tying in to its acquiescence accusation (see section 
5.2). Importantly, however, it did not dispute the aspect of exclusivity already attaching to a 
State’s sovereign rights. Rather, Ghana argued that Cȏte d’Ivoire could not claim having such 
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exclusivity, having forfeited its sovereign rights to areas falling on Ghana’s side of the 
equidistance boundary due to acquiescence. 
The Chamber began its analysis with indicating where its view converged with those of the 
parties to the dispute, that is: the sovereign rights coastal States have over the continental 
shelf are exclusive and exist ab initio.191 The Chamber went on to recognize that the States 
concerned held similar views over the nature of delimitation being declarative in nature. 
However, characterizing delimitation as inherently declarative is false according to the 
Chamber, stating that delimitation “cannot be qualified as merely declarative”,192 but rather 
also possesses constitutive elements. Usually, these rights are considered to have an existence 
independent of delimitation, in that these rights also apply to a disputed part of the 
continental shelf.193 In this light, if another claimant holding a similar entitlement decides to 
act on related rights unilaterally prior to delimitation, the pre-existing rights of the other 
coastal State might be breached. However, the Chamber did not go along these lines of 
argument, stating that international law will only be breached by a State acting unilaterally in 
a disputed maritime area that lacks a good faith claim to the area concerned (see the next 
section).  
Following the Chamber’s finding that the continental shelf rights of coastal States are 
exclusive, and that the entitlement to a continental shelf is automatic, the Chamber discussed 
the issue of the nature of the judgment on delimitation it was called upon to effect. A 
delimitation determines conclusively which parts of a disputed continental shelf area belong 
to which State, coming down to it giving prevalence to one State’s entitlement over another.  
Then, in light of assigning to delimitation both declarative and constitutive aspects, the 
Special Chamber assessed whether a claimant acting unilaterally in a disputed continental 
shelf area can incur international responsibility (see the next section for more).  
So, the reasoning of the Special Chamber challenges what seems to have been a widely held 
overall assumption: delimitation is declarative of pre-existing rights. In fact, the roots of the 
rather unconvincing reasoning of the Chamber that e.g., unfolds on the issue of international 
responsibility, as will be discussed next, can be retraced to this characterization of the nature 
of delimitation.  
                                                        
191 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 590. 
192 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 591. 
193 See e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 35, ¶ 19 
39 
 
 
5.3.4 Were paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 LOSC breached by Ghana? 
In substantiating its argument that Ghana through its unilateral actions violated international 
law, Cȏte d’Ivoire invoked both paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC.194 The 
Special Chamber in its analysis addressed whether any breaches of these paragraphs had 
occurred.  
It started with answering the question whether the claimed violation by Cȏte d’Ivoire of the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith, as was argued to be enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 
83 LOSC, could be upheld. The Chamber began by recognizing that there is a close tie 
between negotiations and delimitation, in that the first necessarily precedes the latter. 
Negotiating was found to be a particularly appropriate vehicle when “States conduct maritime 
activities in close proximity” to each other.195 As the obligation to negotiate is an obligation 
of conduct, a breach of paragraph 1 of Article 83 LOSC could according to the Chamber not 
be assumed if the “result expected” by one of the claimants is not met. Important in this 
regard was that Cȏte d’Ivoire failed to produce any evidence of several rounds of held 
negotiations spanning a 6-year period, not being conducted in a meaningful manner; i.e., they 
did not show there being a lack of good faith on the part of Ghana. Neither could the initial 
unwillingness of Ghana to bring the dispute to international adjudication be seen as breaching 
the obligation to negotiate in good faith.196 One reason for this is that Article 298 LOSC 
explicitly permits States to place certain types of disputes beyond the reach of binding dispute 
settlement.197 Therefore, Cȏte d’Ivoire seeking to maintain the existing status quo as it 
deemed to exist (i.e., that no unilateral economic conduct was taking place in the disputed 
area), and the unwillingness of Ghana to accede thereto, could not be seen as a breach of the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith.  
The Chamber made it clear that two separate obligations are set out in paragraph 3 of Article 
83 LOSC, which are interrelated.198 A further link was recognized to exist between the two 
obligations in the sense of the nature of obligation they lay down: either of these stipulated an 
obligation of conduct. The point at which paragraph 3 would become relevant according to 
                                                        
194 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 596. 
195 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 604. 
196 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 604. 
197 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 604. 
198 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (Judgment), supra note 6, ¶ 626.  
40 
 
the Special Chamber in Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire is when “the maritime delimitation dispute has 
been established”.199 This paragraph ceases to exert its relevance when States have effected 
“a final delimitation”, through the conclusion of a delimitation agreement, or when an 
international court or tribunal has delimited the maritime boundary.200  
The Special Chamber abstained from engaging in an in-depth analysis of the meaning of the 
positive obligation included to this aim in paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. This was because 
Cȏte d’Ivoire did not frame any of its submissions along the lines of the obligation to seek 
provisional arrangements being breached, although it made some reference to the obligation 
and breaches thereof in its pleadings.201 However, the Chamber did elaborate on the content 
of this obligation in a broader sense by stating that it connotes an “obligation of result”: the 
States concerned have to make good faith efforts to conclude provisional arrangements.202 
The addition of the phrase “in a spirit of understanding and cooperation” was considered to 
“enhance” this obligation.203 However, it is not entirely clear how this obligation is 
“enhanced”, with the defining standard remaining that States have to make good faith efforts 
in setting up provisional arrangements successfully. 
5.3.5 The Special Chamber’s interpretation of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize204 
Due to the strong emphasis placed by Cȏte d’Ivoire on the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize, the Special Chamber began by addressing the issue of how to define its 
underlying nature. As to determine whether the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is an 
obligation of conduct (i.e., pactum de contrahendo) or result (i.e., pactum de negotiando), 
forming an understanding of the words of “shall make every effort” was regarded critical by 
the Special Chamber. It interpreted this phrase as being applicable to both obligations in 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. This was confirmed by the use of the word “and” linking 
the second limb of the sentence to its first part.205 By reaching the conclusion that there is a 
good faith component attached to the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, the Special 
Chamber followed the line that the Tribunal in its award Guyana v. Suriname set out 
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earlier.206 Reinforcing this position is the literature, where the view regularly emerges that the 
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is an obligation of conduct.207  
Following the determination as to its nature, the Chamber acknowledged that the parties to 
the dispute vocalized different views in relation to two aspects connected to paragraph 3 and 
the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize as collected thereunder: first, whether it was 
breached; and, second, whether paragraph 3 would be applicable. After concluding earlier 
that the acquiescence claim could not succeed, the Chamber made it clear that a breach of 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC required there being a disputed continental shelf area in 
relation to which a unilateral act was undertaken.208  
The Special Chamber observed obiter dictum that although Ghana suspended new drilling in 
the disputed area, as it was ordered to do in the interim measures phase, “preferably” it would 
have done this earlier when Cȏte d’Ivoire previously requested this.209 This statement has to 
be probably read as being in the nature of lege ferenda, rather than grounding in a legal 
obligation; the Chamber did not even order a stop to initiated drilling operations in the 
interim measures phase despite Cȏte d’Ivoire’s request to this aim (see section 4.3).  
The circumstance that the areas where the unilateral conduct was undertaken were considered 
to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Ghana, as they fell on its own side of the established 
boundary, had to inevitably carry great weight according to the Chamber. As a result, Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s submission building on the view that the unilateral acts were undertaken “in the 
Ivorian maritime areas”210 became meaningless according to the Chamber. Falling back on a 
formalist reasoning, by pointing to that the areas were located on Ghana’s own side of the 
boundary, the Special Chamber made it clear that these areas could not be considered Ivorian; 
hence, its submission could not succeed.211 Judge Mensah, in his separate opinion, and in 
assessing whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC was breached, adopted a similar 
argumentation: given that the areas in question were in the final judgment attributed to 
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Ghana, the issue of infringement was a non-sequitur.212  
What is problematic with these findings is that both seem to operate on a misunderstanding of 
paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC: this paragraph is concerned with whether a unilateral act 
undertaken in a disputed continental shelf area, during the time that it was disputed had an 
effect of hampering or jeopardizing reaching a delimitation agreement. And not whether this 
unilateral act in hindsight, i.e., ex post facto, with the newly acquired knowledge at one’s 
disposal of who has exclusive jurisdiction over the area because it lies on a State’s own side 
of the boundary, breached the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize. The way in which the 
Special Chamber interpreted paragraph 3 renders it effectively meaningless; this is further 
enhanced by combining the reasoning in regard to whether international responsibility could 
be incurred with the Chamber’s interpretation of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC. 
5.3.6 Acting unilaterally in areas brought under the exclusive jurisdiction of the other 
claimant: can there be international responsibility? 
After considering the areas where the unilateral mineral resource activity had taken place 
were on Ghana’s side of the boundary, the Special Chamber made it clear that the issue it 
needed to analyze was as follows: can international responsibility be engaged when unilateral 
acts have been “carried out in a part of the area attributed by the judgment to the other 
State”.213 Framed differently, the question was, can international responsibility be incurred by 
Ghana for unilateral conduct in relation to the disputed continental shelf area that, was argued 
by Cȏte d’Ivoire to have resulted in a breach of its sovereign rights, particularly infringing on 
their exclusivity, even though in the final apportionment the areas were not located on the 
latter’s side of the boundary? 
In an earlier consideration, the Special Chamber acknowledged that Ghana’s unilateral 
activities were however undertaken in what at the time could be considered the maritime area 
of dispute.214 Judge Paik also emphasized this aspect in his separate opinion. However, the 
importance attributed thereto, and the conclusion Judge Paik draws therefrom are very 
different from the one of the Special Chamber.215  
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According to the Special Chamber, determining which parts of the disputed area belonged to 
either Ghana or Cȏte d’Ivoire through delimitation, involves a prioritization of one coastal 
State’s entitlement to a continental shelf over the entitlement of the other coastal State; i.e., 
there is a constitutive component to a delimitation (see the previous section). In the following 
finding, the Special Chamber made it clear when international responsibility would be 
incurred because of there being a breach of a rule of international law, in case a State acts 
unilaterally in relation to a disputed continental shelf area: 
 In the view of the Special Chamber, the consequence of the above is that maritime activities 
 undertaken by a State in an area of the continental shelf which has been attributed to another 
 State by an international judgment cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign  rights of the 
 latter if those activities were carried out before the judgment was delivered and if  the area concerned 
 was the subject of claims made in good faith by both States. 
One implication of this finding is that if a State has acted unilaterally in a part of a disputed 
continental shelf area prior to delimitation, and that area is ultimately considered to be under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the acting State, there can be no violation of the sovereign rights 
of the other coastal State, which claimed entitlements over the same area prior to delimitation 
but to whom the area was not attributed after a delimitation judgment.216  
The same holding also implies the possibility for incurring international responsibility by a 
State acting unilaterally prior to delimitation being extremely limited. As long as the area 
where the act occurred was claimed in good faith by the State acting unilaterally it will avoid 
responsibility; this is even if the area falls on the side of the boundary of the other State after 
delimitation.  
The Special Chamber found judicial authority for this view in the ICJ’s ruling in Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia).217 This latter case involved Nicaragua 
requesting the ICJ for a declaration containing that “Colombia is not acting in accordance 
with her obligations under international law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua 
from accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian”.218 
Colombia contested this assertion. One of the grounds it invoked was that, States do not 
claim reparation for acts that were conducted previously (i.e., prior to final settlement) in a 
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disputed area, if the area involved is ultimately established to be located on the side of the 
boundary of the State that acted unilaterally.219 Ghana also relied on this holding, in the 
context of its argument that international responsibility cannot be incurred from carrying out 
activities to which Cȏte d’Ivoire had acquiesced.220  
The ICJ in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) was unwilling to 
provide the declaration requested by Nicaragua, to the effect that Colombia’s acts undertaken 
in a disputed maritime area were declared unlawful from the view of international law. In its 
analysis, the ICJ placed special emphasis on that different parts of the area in dispute were 
considered to be under the jurisdiction of the different States involved.221  
By way of contrast, in the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire, the 
areas where exploitation activities in the disputed maritime area were undertaken were in the 
final apportionment all considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Ghana. The 
following consequence followed from applying the finding of the ICJ in Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) by analogy to the dispute between Ghana and 
Cȏte d’Ivoire: even if the areas in relation to which Ghana was on the verge of producing 
mineral resources would have been considered to be under the jurisdiction of Cȏte d’Ivoire, 
there would have been no violation of its sovereign rights.222  
To use the Chamber’s own words, this would be no different “even assuming that some of 
those activities took place in areas attributed to Cȏte d’Ivoire by the present judgment”.223 In 
light of that the areas did not fall on Cȏte d’Ivoire side of the established boundary, it is not 
entirely clear why the Special Chamber obiter dictum stated that this would have not been 
different if the area would have been considered to be under Cȏte d’Ivoire’s exclusive 
jurisdiction after delimitation; in fact, this seems to have been a largely unnecessary 
statement of the Chamber.  
And the ruling on this point constitutes a clear break with what the Special Chamber itself 
held in the interim measures phase, where a risk of irreparability was tied to the area where 
Ghana undertook the unilateral acts in relation to mineral resources being placed under Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s exclusive jurisdiction; this earlier recognized risk now did no longer exist. Perhaps 
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this is more easily explained by the fact that there now is an established maritime boundary.  
But there is another difficulty with how the Special Chamber framed its reasoning, 
particularly in light of it recognizing that the coastal State has ab initio rights to the 
continental shelf.224 However, it then subsequently assume that there will be no breach of 
these rights prior to delimitation in the following case: if a part of the continental shelf is in 
dispute and claimed in good faith by a claimant acting unilaterally, there will not be a breach 
of another claimant’s rights before or after delimitation. The logic laid out here by the 
Chamber seemingly can only really stand up to scrutiny if the States concerned not have pre-
existing rights to the disputed area, due to delimitation being constitutive of these rights for 
States; this is a view that was prior to this judgment highly uncommon.  
5.3.7 The separate opinion of Judge Paik: the neglected importance of the obligation to not 
hamper or jeopardize  
The separate opinion of Judge Paik contributes to a better understanding of what the content 
of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation consists of. In this separate opinion, 
he discussed the modalities of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC in some detail. What 
motivated Judge Paik writing this opinion was that, the Chamber neglected the relevance and 
practical importance of this obligation in framing its decision.  
Nonetheless, Judge Paik did not vote in favor of Cȏte d’Ivoire’s submission that paragraph 3 
of Article 83 LOSC was breached. The formulation of Cȏte d’Ivoire’s submission on this 
point, referring to the disputed area as exclusively belonging to Cȏte d’Ivoire, enabled him to 
follow the unanimous decision that Ghana had not breached paragraph 3 of Article 83 
LOSC.225 With the benefit of hindsight, the unilateral conduct occurred in an area that could 
not be considered Ivorian.226 Judge Paik made it clear that he would not have followed the 
majority’s view, had Cȏte d’Ivoire’s submission been worded differently.227 However, Judge 
Paik expressed his reservations in relation to how the Chamber treated paragraph 3 of Article 
83 LOSC in a more general sense.  
First, the Chamber, through how it framed its judgment brushed over the general importance 
and practical relevance of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation, according 
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to Judge Paik.228 And, second, he was not convinced of “the lawfulness of Ghana’s activities 
in the disputed area in terms of article 83, paragraph 3, of the Convention”.229 After 
acknowledging there are two separate obligations in paragraph 3, geared respectively towards 
cooperation and abstention, Judge Paik’s exclusively directed his attention at the obligation to 
not hamper or jeopardize. The importance of this obligation was signified by that it embodies 
“a fundamental duty of restraint”,230 carrying significant “weight as a fundamental norm”.231 
Further, the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize serves a significant practical purpose in 
light of disputed continental shelves being regular features in the international landscape.232 
Judge Paik, despite acknowledging that the obligation is “scant in substance”, thought it to 
have been deserving of further clarification in this judgment.233 However, the Special 
Chamber passed on the chance of offering welcome guidance on the content of this 
obligation. 
In analyzing the meaning of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, Judge Paik started 
with indicating where a point of agreement with the judgment of the Special Chamber lies: 
the nature of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is not one of result, but rather an 
obligation of conduct.234 In an attempt to circumscribe the nature of an obligation of conduct, 
Judge Paik adopted the line of approach set out in the Responsibilities and Obligations of 
States with respect to Activities in the Area: States must do their utmost to achieve the aim 
sought after by a provision.235 On the issue of the extent of the limitation imposed by the 
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize on the possibility to act unilaterally, it was abundantly 
clear in the view of Judge Paik that a moratorium was not meant to be introduced.236 This 
aspect was borne out by both the language of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC and its 
negotiating history.237 As a result, the contention of Cȏte d’Ivoire that “activities by the States 
concerned” in a disputed maritime area must be abjured in a comprehensive sense could not 
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succeed.238 As regards to how the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation 
interacts with the obligation to seek provisional arrangement, both being collected under the 
same paragraph 3, Judge Paik held that the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize would “be 
particularly relevant” where there are no provisional arrangements into effect, or when the 
arrangement in question is not comprehensive in nature.239 Most provisional arrangements are 
not comprehensive in scope, however, keeping alive the possibility of conflict arising 
concerning those types of acts that are unregulated by these arrangements. 
The question of what acts are captured under this obligation’s reach, takes on a particular 
urgency in light of there being no elaboration on what unilateral acts exert an effect of 
hampering or jeopardizing. According to Judge Paik, deciding on what unilateral conduct is 
(un)lawful in the disputed maritime area involved, had to be measured by the impact made on 
the chances of successfully reaching a delimitation, or on negotiations if they are being, or 
have been, pursued to that end. Construed thus, a breach of the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize becomes entwined to the circumstances at hand.240 This aspect of the specific 
situation present in a disputed area is what rendered the distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful acts in abstracto a futile exercise, in the view of Judge Paik.  
Despite acknowledging the dependency of this assessment on the specific circumstances of a 
disputed maritime area, some measure of approximation of this scope is possible: but the 
caveat is that an act is likely to be lawful or unlawful, but no absolute determinations can be 
made. With regard to acts resulting in “a permanent physical change to the marine 
environment”,241 chances are that they have an effect of prejudicing the final agreement. 
However, activities effecting change falling short thereof, can just as well have an effect of 
hampering or jeopardizing.242 Therefore, seeing causing permanent physical change to be the 
defining standard against which to measure the lawfulness of a unilateral act is misplaced. 
Rather, this criterion forms one “relevant factor” among “several” influencing the scope for 
unilateralism in relation to a disputed continental shelf area. And there is also no hierarchical 
ordering between these factors. So, the threshold of “a permanent physical change to the 
marine environment” does not necessarily prevail over any other factors that can be 
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identified.243 Judge Paik, who focused mainly on the unilateral act as such, and the effects it 
exerts on a particular maritime boundary dispute, subsequently adduced a list of relevant 
factors: “type, nature, location, and time” combined with the “manner in which they are 
carried out” are all relevant in ascertaining whether a unilateral act is reconcilable with the 
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.244 
Ghana must have become fully aware of that there was a dispute with Cȏte d’Ivoire at some 
moment in time, certainly no later than in 2009.245 Rather than subsequently adopting a 
posture of restraint, which seemed necessary, Ghana stepped up the frequency with which it 
undertook activities within the disputed maritime area; this intensification was in the view of 
Judge Paik not reconcilable with the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation.246  
Ghana’s unilateral activities were undertaken in areas that were ex post facto considered to be 
under its exclusive jurisdiction (i.e., they fell on Ghana’s side of the boundary line); however, 
this aspect should according to judge Paik not factor into the determination of the obligation 
to not hamper or jeopardize having being breached. Lying behind this argument was the 
assumption that paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC applies exclusively to the period preceding 
continental shelf delimitation; therefore, assessing whether a unilateral act breaches the 
paragraph must be fully set in the moment of it being undertaken.247  
Taking the opposite view, that a unilateral act undertaken in a disputed maritime area loses its 
unlawful character depending on whether that part of the area is placed under that State’s 
jurisdiction after delimitation, would deprive the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize 
delimitation of the continental shelf of the main aim that it is meant to serve:248 ensuring that 
unilateral acts undertaken pending delimitation do not hamper or jeopardize that the claimant 
States concerned are successful in reaching the final delimitation. 
6. The implications of Ghana/Cȏte d’Ivoire for the rights and obligations of States in 
disputed maritime areas: a muddying of the waters? 
A key determinant for the relevance of the judgment of the Special Chamber in relation to the 
issue of the scope that remains for unilateralism in disputed maritime areas concerning 
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mineral resources, was the acquiescence claim of Ghana being successful. This line of 
argument did not convince the Special Chamber, however: the evidence adduced fell short of 
meeting the required threshold of being compelling.249  
As a result, the judgment can be analyzed through the lens of the added value for determining 
the rights and obligations States have in relation to a disputed continental shelf area. Now, to 
revert to the main question this article sought to answer: what lessons can be learned from the 
maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and Cȏte d’Ivoire in relation to the issue of what 
the rights and obligations are of States in disputed continental shelf areas, and in relation to 
what scope is reserved for unilateral conduct to access the mineral resources located therein? 
Ghana’s moving to the advanced stage of being on the verge of taking wells in a disputed 
area into production, makes this case the first in its kind: an international court and tribunal 
was asked to rule on the lawfulness of a State being close to exploiting mineral resources 
from a disputed maritime area, as well as on the lawfulness of the preliminary acts 
undertaken enabling Ghana to progress to this stage. Based on the previous case law, the 
following answer was likely to be given to the question about how to view the unilateral acts 
of Ghana from the perspective of international law: these activities are unlawful, given that 
exploratory and exploitation drilling result in causing irreparable damage to the rights of the 
other claimant, combined with that it would significantly risk damaging the marine 
environment, modifying the characteristics of the seabed to a degree that the resultant damage 
would be irreparable.  
In the interim measures phase, signs of a break with previous case law started to first emerge. 
The Chamber, falling short of suspending all drilling, 250 ordered Ghana to abstain only from 
new drilling in the disputed maritime area. Leaving those operations already set in motion 
unaffected, was motivated by other environmental considerations and financial repercussions 
being simultaneously in play, which argued both against this, according to the Chamber. In 
its interim measures order, the Chamber recognized that “exploration and exploitation 
activities” raised the threat of irreparability to rights; a right to information existing for the 
coastal State in relation to the composition of the continental shelf similarly was considered 
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to be under threat (see section 4.3). By recognizing a risk of irreparability to flow from the 
unilateral collection of information, in this regard, the order of the Special Chamber went 
beyond what was earlier held in case law. This risk of irreparability coming to fruition was in 
the interim measures phase tied to the area being considered as to ultimately be under Cȏte 
d’Ivoire’s exclusive jurisdiction. At first glance, the view espoused here by the Chamber 
shows some resemblance to Aegean Continental Shelf (interim measures), where the ICJ in 
its decision held that a risk of irreparable prejudice being engendered by unilateral seismic 
work was dependent on that the area where the work took place was considered to be under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of Greece.251 However, and importantly, the ICJ thought this line of 
reasoning could only be applied to seismic work, not to exploratory drilling and exploitation 
activities, including bringing installations into position. In the view of the ICJ, had one of 
these latter categories of unilateral activity been undertaken, it would have offered interim 
protection to the end of prohibiting these types of acts from being undertaken pendente litis.  
These deviations from the previous case law have become more pronounced in the judgment 
on the merits. Parts of the judgment on the merits are (similarly) largely irreconcilable with 
what was held in the interim measures phase. While earlier recognizing a danger of causing 
irreparable prejudice to rights,252 the materialization of this risk would result from the 
following unilateral activities: gathering information, and conducting exploration and 
exploitation activities.253 Although none of the areas in dispute fell on Cȏte d’Ivoire’s side of 
the established boundary, the Special Chamber addressed obiter dictum as to when a breach 
of the sovereign rights of Cȏte d’Ivoire, possibly incurring international responsibility, would 
have occurred: this would be limited to if a claimant lacking a good faith claim over the 
disputed area, would act in connection therewith unilaterally. 
Ghana contended that acts in relation to mineral resources formed part of the status quo 
existing between itself and Côte d’Ivoire; being a constituent part thereof, they could not be 
assumed to have an effect of hampering or jeopardizing delimitation.254 The main element 
having shaped the current and relevant status quo was, in the view of Ghana, Cȏte d’Ivoire’s 
acquiescence, with the result that the undertaken acts had become an integral part of this 
status quo; hence, there could be no breach of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC.  
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The treatment the Special Chamber gave to paragraph 3 was minimal; dismissing the 
paragraph’s relevance based on a highly formalistic reasoning. After pronouncing itself on 
the nature of the obligation (i.e., forming an obligation of conduct) and stating that it is 
predominantly relevant in the absence of agreed provisional arrangements, the analysis of the 
Chamber in terms of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC does not progress much beyond this 
point; this was due to the way in which Cȏte d’Ivoire committed its submission to paper.255 
Given that the paragraph applies in areas of disputed continental shelf, framing its submission 
in terms of that these acts occurred with the maritime zones of Cȏte d’Ivoire could be easily 
brushed aside as anticipating events which would have yet to come to pass, or perhaps not at 
all if the area was attributed to Ghana, as it ultimately was. Hence, this framing by Cȏte 
d’Ivoire of its submission that Ghana’s unilateral acts occurred in the “Ivorian maritime area” 
can be regarded to have been unfortunate. Yet the submission of Cȏte d’Ivoire was concerned 
with a larger area than the area up to the equidistance boundary line as determined by the 
Chamber. Therefore, dismissing Cȏte d’Ivoire’s submission on the ground that it was mainly 
concerned with the area up to the equidistance line cannot completely convince.256  
To dismiss the relevance of this paragraph on the ground of the area in question not being 
ultimately considered to be on Cȏte d’Ivoire’s side of the established boundary, roots in a 
misunderstanding of paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC by the Chamber. This is because the 
paragraph is not meant to function as a tool to determine ex post facto (i.e., after delimitation) 
the lawfulness of a unilateral acts undertaken prior thereto, by setting this determination in 
the time of it becoming clear where the boundary lies. Rather, paragraph 3 is meant to exert 
its relevance prior to delimitation: pursuant to which acts undertaken unilaterally prior to 
delimitation, and which have an effect of hampering or jeopardizing the final delimitation can 
be considered unlawful. The unconvincing interpretation of the Special Chamber of 
paragraph 3 seems to be entwined with another unconvincing set of considerations with 
regard to whether international responsibility could be incurred (see section 5.3.6). In turn, 
both the elements – that there was no breach of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize nor 
international responsibility was incurred for violations alleged by Cȏte d’Ivoire on its 
sovereign rights through Ghana’s unilateral acts – can be considered to be connected with the 
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Special Chamber’s finding of delimitation not being exclusively declarative (see section 
5.3.3). 
Had Cȏte d’Ivoire’s submission of been framed differently, Judge Paik indicated he would 
have voted in favor of that paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC was breached. Yet a broader 
question is, how likely would it have been that the ultimate outcome of the majority’s 
decision would have been similarly different, had the submission been worded differently? 
The Chamber’s analysis on the point of incurring international responsibility provides for a 
bleak forecast that this would have been the case. Although, from the perspective of logic, it 
would have made more sense to discuss the aspect of whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 
LOSC was breached before the Special Chamber addressed the issue of international 
responsibility, its analysis of paragraph 3 was reserved to a later point in the judgment. By 
placing this analysis after dealing with the issue of international responsibility, the Chamber 
seems to suggest that international responsibility could not have been incurred by breaching 
this paragraph.  
The obligation to not hamper or jeopardize imposes a de facto, not de jure limitation on when 
claimed rights may be put to actual use by coastal States in a disputed area. Yet the practical 
possibility for claimant States to undertake unilateral acts in relation to disputed EEZ or 
continental shelf areas is reduced to those acts conforming to the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize.257 The existence of pre-existing rights to the disputed maritime area of coastal 
States, which can be breached, is the precondition on which paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC 
operates. What the Special Chamber seemingly failed to recognize however is that, the extent 
to which claimants can exercise sovereign rights over the disputed continental shelf area prior 
to delimitation, is largely governed by paragraph 3. So, construed thus, the argument can be 
made that it would have been essential for the Special Chamber to address the meaning of 
paragraph 3 in light of Cȏte d’Ivoire’s contention that its sovereign rights were infringed 
upon, because of the unilateral acts undertaken by Ghana; irrespective of that Cȏte d’Ivoire 
did not directly contend that paragraph 3 was breached in this particular way.  
The Special Chamber seems to employ a different definition of delimitation being 
constitutive than used in earlier case law. Departing from the view that delimitation is merely 
declarative of rights, it assigns to delimitation a dual nature in that it carries both constitutive 
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and declarative aspects. A difficulty with this view would be to disentangle those parts of 
delimitation that are declarative in nature from those that are constitutive; e.g., is delimitation 
constitutive of the rights coastal States have over the continental shelf, rendering, as Ghana 
suggested in its pleadings, a disputed maritime area essentially terrae nullius prior thereto; or, 
rather, is perhaps the feature of the exclusive character of rights entwined with completing a 
delimitation?  
Looking at the reasoning that unfolded after the Special Chamber construed the nature of 
delimitation as being composed of both declarative and constitutive components, particularly 
concerning international responsibility and whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC was 
breached, strongly suggests that the Special Chamber considers delimitation to be mainly 
constitutive of rights. This is because the outcome of the Chamber’s decision on these two 
points, is difficult to reconcile with delimitation indeed being declarative of pre-existing 
rights; in other words, sovereign rights for coastal States do not seem to exist, or alternatively 
cannot be breached, which seems to undercut the essence of possessing rights.  
Perhaps, however, an alternative explanation might be that the Special Chamber construed 
the relation between having an entitlement to a continental shelf and the Chamber’s 
delimitation judgment, as that related rights will become exclusive in nature once the 
maritime boundary has been established by the Chamber. Under that view, prior to 
delimitation there is a coexistence of rights with none of the States concerned being able to 
fall back on their exclusive nature; in a way there would be a cancelling out of this aspect of 
exclusiveness due to these co-existing sets of rights. The final judgment will clarify the exact 
extent of a State’s sovereign rights over the continental shelf, whereby the coastal State’s 
exercise of these related rights will become complete. On this interpretation, the constitutive 
aspect of the judgment would lie in that the exercise of a coastal State’s sovereign rights is no 
longer qualified due to another coastal State claiming similar rights, but that after delimitation 
it can fully exercise these rights in areas considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
one coastal State.  
However that may be, what remains highly unsatisfactory with the judgment of the Chamber 
is when international responsibility can be engaged for unilateral acts undertaken in relation 
to a disputed continental shelf area: the sovereign rights the coastal State has over the 
continental shelf, which are ab initio and ipso facto, cannot be breached by another claimant 
State unless it lacks a good faith claim over a disputed maritime area, putting into question 
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how inherent and exclusive these rights really are.  
By assigning delimitation at least partly a constitutive effect, the Special Chamber does not 
render the disputed area “no one’s waters”; this is because having an entitlement to the 
continental shelf area precedes the possibility to act in relation thereto. But, rather as waters 
in relation to which claimants holding a good faith claim can act freely and without the threat 
of incurring responsibility ex post facto, for acting during the time that the area is disputed. 
According to the Chamber, if a State has a good faith claim, no international responsibility 
will be incurred, even if ex post facto the area is located on the side of the boundary of the 
other, non-acting, coastal State.  
Because of delimitation being in part of a constitutive nature, as the reasoning of the 
Chamber implies, paragraph 3 of Article 83 LOSC, is seemingly also deprived of much 
significance: breaching the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is tied to when a State, 
lacking a good faith claim, would act unilaterally in relation to a disputed maritime area. This 
can function as an incentive for a claimant State having a good faith claim to start acting 
unilaterally in relation to a disputed maritime area, leading to the question whether the 
direction established by the Special Chamber is commendable in dealing with such areas, 
which will be explored next.  
7. Concluding remarks on broader implications for disputed maritime areas: does the 
judgment provide cause for alarm?  
Broader (adverse) consequences may flow from the judgment of the Special Chamber. A 
source for concern is that, the Special Chamber has provided a State that wants to undertake 
acts unilaterally within a disputed continental shelf area with the judicial authority to do so. 
By setting the threshold as to whether undertaking a unilateral act is allowed at when that part 
of the disputed maritime area is claimed in good faith by the State, this means a unilateral act 
can practically always proceed in relation to a disputed continental shelf area, seemingly 
without incurring international responsibility; this is even if the area after delimitation is part 
of the other claimant’s maritime zone.  
Other effects that might follow from a claimant undertaking acts unilaterally, including the 
bilateral relations between States being detrimentally affected are e.g., excluded from 
consideration by following this new ‘path’ of the Chamber. By focusing exclusively on the 
validity of the claim of a coastal State implies that, all other arguments arguing in favor of 
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adopting more restraint in such areas – including, that unilateral acts concerning mineral 
resources are regularly highly controversial, prompting protests and may breed new acts of 
unilateralism in response – are excluded by the Chamber as relevant considerations. The 
aspect of preserving the exclusivity that is attached to States’ sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf, and the resources contained therein, was neither deemed a relevant 
consideration by the Chamber. 258   
Merely requiring that the area is claimed in good faith is not a very demanding requirement. 
It significantly lowers the bar for States seeking to act unilaterally in relation to a disputed 
continental shelf area. Following this argument, in a more general sense and by applying it by 
analogy to other disputed maritime areas, particularly those that regularly create conflict and 
where unilateral acts are recurrent sources of tension between claimant States, the reasoning 
of the Special Chamber cannot but have negative effects. This is especially because it 
effectively offers the claimant States concerned a carte blanche to act unilaterally in relation 
to their disputed continental shelf area.  
Whether the judgment of the Special Chamber is a sign of a significant shift, in the wrong 
direction, remains to be seen, however. Or, rather, an alternative argument would be that the 
specifics of the dispute between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire were of such central importance in 
shaping the outcome of the judgment of the Chamber, that drawing more general conclusions 
as to the state of international law in relation to disputed maritime areas from it, is 
inappropriate. Particularly, the aspect that Ghana was already in a very advanced stage of 
development of the disputed maritime area, being close to production, can be seen as relevant 
under this view. Had the Chamber ruled differently, serious financial consequences might 
have followed for Ghana and its concessionaires. Investors would inevitably pull out from 
earlier taken on commitments, which would lead to the abandonment of all development of 
mineral resources in the near future, and also leaving the equipment already moved into place 
to deteriorate up to a point where it could no longer properly function.  
The next judgment that can add to the discussion as to the issue of what the rights and 
obligations are of States in disputed maritime areas, and which might offer a better indication 
in which direction judicial opinion is moving, is perhaps the maritime boundary dispute 
between Kenya and Somalia, where the latter complained of the unlawfulness of unilateral 
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acts undertaken by Kenya.259 A return to the line set out previously in Guyana v. Suriname, 
although also flawed on certain points, is very much preferable to following the Chamber’s 
judgment in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. 
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